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 During the last decade mobile phones and tablets evolved into smart devices with 
enormous computing power and storage capacity packed in a pocket size. People around 
the globe have quickly moved from laptops to smartphones for their daily computational 
needs. From web browsing, social networking, photography to critical bank payments 
and intellectual property every thing has got into smartphones; and undoubtedly Android 
has dominated the smartphone market. Android growth also attracted cyber criminals to 
focus on creating attacks and malwares to target Android users. Malwares in different 
category are seen in the Android ecosystem, including botnets, Ransomware, click 
Trojan, SMS frauds, banking Trojans.  
  Due to huge amount of application being developed and distributed every day, 
Android needs malware analysis techniques that are different than any other operating 
system. This research focuses on defining a process of finding Android malware in a 
given large number of new applications. Research utilizes machine learning techniques in 
predicting possible malware and further provide assistance in reverse engineering of 
malware. Under this thesis an assistive Android malware analysis system “AndroSandX” 
is proposed, researched and developed. AndroSandX allows researcher to quickly analyze 
potential Android malware and help perform manual analysis.  
 Key features of the system are strong assistive capabilities using machine 
learning, built in ticketing system, highly modular design, storage with non-relational 
databases, backup of analysis data for archival, assistance in manual analysis and threat 
intelligence. Research results shows that the system has a prediction accuracy of around 
92%. Research has wide scope and lean towards providing industry oriented Android 
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 Android application development and Android mobile market has expanded 
tremendously in last few year. One of the core success reasons behind Android OS is its 
easy application development and distribution. Google Play Store and many other 
Android application markets across the globe allow developer to upload and distribute 
their applications almost in runtime. Publishing and updates to application are very easy 
and goes through very little manual review. While the ease of distribution helped 
developers on one side, the adversity of system was it made distribution of malicious 
applications considerably easy. Due to tremendous volume and continuous increase in 
Android application uploads; it is highly difficult and costly to do manual review of 
applications. These Android market conditions resulted in fairly easy creation and 
distribution of Android malware.   
 Due to limitations on manual review of applications, Android market needed fast 
and efficient automated malware analysis system. Leading application stores like Google 
Play Store have developed their own automated malware analysis solutions and took 
down the existing malwares, but small size application stores still mostly depend on 
traditional hash based scanning techniques. This thesis study was carried out realizing a 
great need and scope for research in automated Android malware analysis. 
 Android malware analysis system “AndroSandX” is developed. AndroSandX is 
an assistive tool to reduce the set of possible malware in the given random set of Android 
application and provide ticket based malware analysis system for tracking and providing 
systematic approach for creation of IDS signature through manual analysis, storage of 
such signature and testing them. 
 Under this research 15000 Android applications were primarily used, which 
further narrowed down to 3083 malware and 1775 benign applications for machine 
learning purpose. Total of 153 unique features are extracted for each application from 
static and dynamic analysis data. A mixed application test set of 509 applications was 
used for testing prediction capability of AndroSandX. The system was successful with a 
predictions rate of around 92%, with a strong assistive capability in further performing 





 Research focuses way beyond just proving feasibility of machine learning based 
Android malware prediction. Research strongly aims towards giving a prototype of a 
system that defines standard process for Android malware analysis and provide assistance 
at every step in analysis. AndroSandX is equipped with Ticketing system, machine 
leaning, non-relational database, intrusion detection system integration, reverse 
engineering, debugging and signature deployment capability. Extensive threat 
intelligence is used.  
 Research implements experimentation based analysis approach. Experimentation 
required understanding in following domains: Android operating system, malware 
analysis, Python programming, MongoDB, Snort IDS/IPS implementations, Network 
security analysis, Machine learning, sandboxing implementations, network setup, server 
deployments and threat intelligence.  
 This research resulted into proving feasibility and implementation of machine 
learning based Android malware analysis approach. Research also helped in providing 
standard Android malware analysis approach, assistive tool and IDS signature creation 
assistance.  





2 Related work: 
2.1 Android Malware statistics, malware types and categorization 
 Almost 1.4 Billion mobile devices were sold in 2015, out of which 5/6 of the 
devices run Android OS [3]. The number of mobile devices running Android OS is on 
tremendous increase in recent years. Which is also the reason for increase in 
sophisticated attacks and exploit development on Android platform [2][3]. Cyber 
criminals are focusing and investing in development of considerably larger amount of 
malwares and exploits for Android platform [4]. Malware in Android are no more just 
SMS Trojans or Spyware, multiple categories of Android malware are on rise mainly 
including Ransomware, Hostile Downloaders, Botnet Trojan [1]. 
 Google categorizes Android malware in to 17 different categories [1], as 
described in Table 1: 
Table 1 :  Google's Android Malware Categories 
Backdoors Commercial Spyware Phishing Applications 
Billing Fraud Data Collection Trojan 
SMS Fraud Denial of Service Ransomware 
Call Fraud Hostile Downloaders Rooting Apps 
Spam Spyware Non-Android Threat 
Wireless Access Protocol 
(WAP) Fraud 
Privilege Escalation Apps  
 
2.2 Malware analysis Techniques 
 Android malware analysis involves multiple stages. Practical world detection 
techniques are limited to network-based detection and host-based signature detection. 
Network-based detection includes network data transfer level byte pattern match, 
network protocol, IP/Domain blacklisting and URL pattern match. Host-based 
detection most of the time involves hash and byte code pattern based detection. 
Android application development and application store have large diversity, which 
leads to rapid development of applications. Large number of applications gets 
uploaded every day across the globe, targeting multiple variants of Android platform. 





of code and easy distribution of application allows malware authors to easily avoid 
signature-based detection.  
 There are different approaches for malware detection suggested by Android 
security researchers around the world. Android malware can be detected through code 
level signatures and Android instruction code. Detection through certain pattern 
matching of Application package name and methods/functions is possible [11]. Some 
other interesting approaches include visual representation of binaries [12], hybrid 
analysis using an attack tree based approach [14]. Researchers have developed 
assistive malware prediction tools to allow malware researchers find possible 
unknown malware in given set of applications[19][20][24][25].  
2.2.1 Android Malware Analysis Methods:  
 Analysis methods can be categorized based of the data collection by 
performing execution or without execution of application. Three main categories 
are defined as follows - static, dynamic and hybrid analysis.  
2.2.1.1 Static Analysis  
 Static analysis mainly focuses on the data that can be collected from an 
Android application executable .apk file. Focus of the static analysis is bound 
around the code and possible strings and sub routines in the application code. 
Host intrusion detection system usually utilizes this approach. Static analysis 
most of the time focuses on creation of hash signatures and byte code pattern 
signature for detection of malicious applications. De-assembling and manual 
code reviews are core tasks in the static analysis. Hardcoded strings usually 
give idea about the possible malware domain and IP addresses. Also 
sometimes static strings include symmetric key used in encryption of data. In 
case of botnet malware static signatures reveal details about the command and 
control communication mechanism, capabilities and possible instruction set 
that a bot can perform. Even though a lot of information is revealed in the 
static analysis it is not the complete data that one might need to reveal the 
capabilities and features of any malware. Dynamic analysis on the other hand 




malware author hides functionality by using runtime code download, which is 
not detected in the static analysis [11][12][15].  
2.2.1.2 Dynamic Analysis  
 Dynamic analysis focuses on the runtime behavior of the application. 
Analysis involves execution and monitoring of the activity performed by the 
applications. Activity monitoring and data collection is carried out at system 
level, network level and at memory level. System level data includes system 
call and system functions invoked by the applications. Network level data 
included DNS request, payload downloaded, domain and IP addresses 
contacted by application. Network data further reveals details about protocol 
and http request made by the application. Memory level data usually is 
obtained during the debugging of application, which involves code level 
breakpoints and monitoring or registers, stack and heap data.  
 Dynamic analysis is sometimes way more powerful than the static analysis 
as it reveals actual behavior of malware and any intentionally hidden 
functionality[13][15]. Further analysis of dynamically downloaded payload or 
code modules is possible, most of the malwares now days download 
configuration files in runtime. For analyzing botnet and bot-network behavior 
dynamic analysis is very helpful. Network based intrusion 
detection/prevention system (NIDS/NIPS) signature required data is most of 
the time collected through dynamic analysis as post infection activity is very 
important for creation of network-based IDS/IPS. 
2.2.1.3 Hybrid Analysis  
 The best way to gather all analysis relevant data is to follow hybrid 
analysis approach, meaning utilizing static and dynamic analysis together. 
This approach might be resource intensive and time consuming but gives most 
significant and accurate results due to completeness of data. Static analysis is 
usually time efficient and dynamic analysis is more depth oriented. Utilizing 
hybrid analysis allows creation of robust signatures and extraction of dynamic 





gathering maximum number of features allowing more accurate detection, 
also helping in-depth analysis and signature creation[13][14].  
2.3 Detection Techniques: 
 Malware detection techniques are categorized in to two approaches, 
signature based and behavior based. Signature based approach is being very 
accurate in detecting known malwares on the other hand behavior based approach 
allows detection of potential unknown malware.  
2.3.1 Signature Based Approach  
 Signature based detection works at two layers, first is network level and 
second is host level. Network level signatures are usually dependent on 
network traffic features and pattern in network packets to detect possible 
infection. Host level signatures focus more on hash and byte code pattern in 
malicious applications. Signature based detection is very accurate and 
dependable for detecting already analyzed malware or malware family 
[12][15].  
2.3.2 Behavior Based Approach  
 Behavior based approach allows detection of possible unknown malware 
by utilizing knowledge of normal behavior on the network or any host. 
Behavior based analysis looks for possible indicator of compromise, instead 
of looking for any one specific feature. Different execution time behavioral 
pattern and series of activity from an application caused behavioral anomaly 
or possible indicator of compromise pattern match. This approach allows 
detecting suspicious behavior of application further suggesting manual 
analysis [13][15][24][25].  
2.4 Malware detection evasion techniques  
 Symantec 2016 Internet Security Threat Report notifies a critical observation in 
their report stating that the Android malwares are using code obfuscation to avoid 
signature based detection, and additionally use multiple sandbox detection techniques 




more than simple signature based malware detection system. Also robust sandbox 
level anti-evasion techniques need to be used while analyzing malware.  Cuckoo 
Droid [5] focuses on providing an excellent Android sandboxing solution that 
considers the possible anti detection measures. Different techniques are implemented 
including falsifying the system properties, contacts and network properties on 
Android virtual device to overcome malware evasion techniques [5]. Use of anti 
evasion Android framework like Xposed [6] makes Cuckoo Droid a robust Android 
sandbox. Though there are techniques, which allow Android malware to detect 
emulator or virtual machine instance of Android based upon performance parameters, 
use of virtual machine for running Android is very much a strong indication of 
sandboxing environment [8].  
2.5 Malware sandboxing and data collection 
 Different Android sandboxing and malware analysis solutions have been created 
and tested for their efficiency. Automation and extraction of data from different 
phases of Android application execution are the core requirements of sandbox 
[9][10]. Analysis data can be extracted from static code level data, dynamic execution 
time data, network data and Android OS memory related data [26]. Cuckoo Droid is 
one of the most excellent Android malware sandbox available, it provides data for 
static, dynamic and network level analysis, further it also provides Android system 
level function calls and application runtime data. Use of Cuckoo-Droid and its Python 
implementation allows easy integration and extension of functionality.  
2.6 Android Malware analysis using classification or regression techniques  
 Google uses Bouncer a behavior based analysis system to detect malware in the 
Google Play Store [27]. Bouncer utilizes artificial intelligence to perform behavior-
based analysis to predict potential known malware. Researchers utilize features that 
are extracted from static analysis or hybrid analysis data [16][17][18][21]. Machine 
learning algorithms have given very good results and are strong indicatives that more 
research needs to be preceded utilizing this approach. Machine learning algorithms 
used for detecting Android mainly includes support vector machine (svm), random 





learning algorithm also depends on the data used for the feature extraction. Feature 
extraction input data can be strings, floating values, continuously varying values, 
binary values or Boolean. Classification algorithm efficiency also varies with type of 
analysis being used for extracting data. Static analysis, dynamic analysis or hybrid 
analysis needs different algorithms as efficiency of classification changes 
significantly.  
2.7 Android malware analysis assistive systems 
 Android malware analysis due to its huge amount of applications needs a strong 
assistive malware analysis system. Such assistive system should allow researcher to 
automatically perform a classification and present with potential malwares for manual 
analysis. SherlockDroid is one of such system [19]. Assistive tools are also necessary 
to crawl larger amount of applications in any online Android application store and 
successfully predict benign and possible malicious applications [20].  Assistive 
analysis systems utilize machine learning algorithms, perform classification, data 


















3.1 Problem Statement 
 Given a set of Android applications, researcher can perform automated analysis 
and collect data, allowing machine learning based classification.  Classification results in 
malware/benign category. Further allowing creation of IDS signatures to detect flagged 
application. Achieve high efficiency of the malware analysis process by reducing manual 
intervention also making sure system is modular and resource rich.  
3.2 Hypothesis 
 It is very much possible to extract data features of Android application that allows 
successful machine learning based classification of application in to malware/benign 
category. Perfectly sandboxed automated application testing environment provides static 
and dynamic analysis data that can be used for feature extraction. If a system is made 
with a combination of good sandboxing solution, quality threat intelligence data and 
machine learning algorithms then it is possible to find subset of Android application that 
can be classified as potential malware. Once a malware subset is found it can be further 
reverse engineered to create intrusion detection system signatures. This approach would 
help in detecting Android malware without needing extensive manual review, and manual 
analysis efforts will be focused on creating signatures for already predicted malware. 
3.3 Experiment approach 
 The hypothesis of this research is proved using experimentation based proof. The 
research goes through development of a system, which allows sandboxing, automated 
malware analysis, feature extraction and machine learning. Results are collected and 
efficiency matrix is presented to prove the success in classification of Android 
applications as malware or benign category. Further the predicted malware are manually 
reverse engineered to create detection signatures and expected final state of 
experimentation is achieved. 
3.4 Hypothesis proving strategy 
 Experimentation starts with application selection for machine learning phase. 




system to preform automated dynamic and static analysis. Once the data is collected 
machine-learning algorithm is used to build models, these machine-learning models are 
further used for predicting unknown applications. Tested unknown applications are 
checked against threat intelligence data to confirm the true positives and false positives. 
Accuracy rate is calculated and further manual analysis of predicted malware application 
is performed. During manual analysis intrusion detection signatures are created and tested 
against running instance of malicious application to prove successful detection using 
intrusion detection system. Machine learning based malware prediction accuracy and IDS 
alert generation using newly created signature successfully proves the proposed 
hypothesis. 






 The experimentation process is divided in to five steps; these steps are logical 
abstraction of experimentation process.   
• Learning phase data set selection,  





• Machine learning model creation / Training phase,  
• Machine learning prediction phase, 
• Malware reverse engineering phase 
3.5.1 Learning/Training phase data selection 
 For creation of a machine learning models to accurately perform prediction it is 
very important to choose the learning data set properly. The learning data set should be 
from proper trusted source and should be data rich, which allows accurate feature 
extraction. Under this research “VirusTotal.com”[40] is chosen as the source of 
collection of known categorized applications. VirusTotal python accessible APIs are used 
to download set of Android applications that are already detected by 10+ antivirus 
solutions as malware data set. For benign applications data set, VirusTotal Android 
applications with zero known detection from antivirus vendors are chosen. All the 
VirusTotal downloaded applications are not necessarily the right .apk or .zip formatted 
Android applications, and this is because of the files being uploaded all across the globe 
and not always are successfully installed on all Android devices. This non 100% clean 
data also helps to mimic real world data that any Android application store will come 
across. Android applications with compatibility issue, installation issue or running errors 
in sandbox are discarded in later phases to get a cleaner dataset. Once a malware/benign 
classified data set is obtained, then the data is properly tagged and forwarded to next 
layers.  
3.5.2 AndroSandX ticket generation phase  
 Every application that needs to be tested requires a creation of AndroSandX 
analysis ticket. The ticketing system allows task separation and gives independent data 
modification at each layer in analysis. Every layer can check till what layer the ticket is 
currently processed. Layer with dependency on other layer can then check if they can 
pick up the ticket for their analysis phases if current phase of ticket is not amongst the 
acceptable phases of analysis then the layer can throw error indicating it cannot work on 
this ticket. The ticket creation phase requires proper tagging of applications. This phase 




3.5.3 Machine learning model creation/Training phase  
 Analysis tickets get tagged as malware/benign and are further passed to layer that 
perform static and dynamic analysis. During this phase data from static files, network 
traffic, runtime system calls, static functions and operating system level operations is 
collected. Further required threat intelligence is gathered. Once all the required data for 
generation of machine learning features is collected then 153 unique features are 
collected and stored in to the analysis ticket. When all the learning data set applications 
complete feature generation phase, feature data with known classification of application 
is passed through machine learning algorithms to create machine-learning models. These 
models are then tested to make sure they are not over fitted.  
3.5.4 Machine learning prediction phase  
 This phase is the most interesting and crucial part in the experimentation. A 
certain set of mixed applications is chosen from VirusTotal. Actual VirusTotal given 
categorization of these applications is stored for calculating accuracy of the system. 
These applications are tagged as “Analyze” and sent for the static and dynamic analysis 
process. Once a feature generation phase is completed these applications are passed to 
machine learning based prediction. This process utilizes previously calculated machine 
learning models to classify each application into malware or benign category. Once all 
the required applications classes are predicted then they are compared with VirusTotal 
given signature based classification. This comparison gives out the efficiency matrix. 
Also the accuracy of prediction calculated by measuring precision and recall. Predicted 
values are stored in the analysis ticket. Prediction matrix is printed for user information, 
success of the AndroSandX and proof of research hypothesis depends on high prediction 
accuracy of this phase.  
3.5.5 Malware reverse engineering phase 
 In a real world corporate network, most efficient way to detect malicious activity 
is to monitor network though one single point in network. All network traffic should pass 
through this point, so as to detect possible infection, malicious communications and web 
attacks. Other powerful way is to have host based scanners and intrusion detection 




not owned by enterprise and people don't like to have any monitoring application on their 
mobile as it might lead to privacy breach. One of the prime goal of AndroSandX system 
is once an Android application is classified as malware, it should be reverse engineered 
manually and intrusion detection signatures should be created. A good NIDS/HIDS 
signature helps in discovering active infection on the enterprise network, which is of the 
prime importance to any security researcher. Malware reverse engineering phase helps in 
decompiling, debugging the application to walk through assembly code and understand 
the capability of applications. Also extracting unique features and behavioral pattern of 
malware. 
 Manual analysis leads to gathering of lot of new data and signatures, this data is 
stored back into AndroSandX analysis ticket. And SNORT signatures are deployed and 





4 Experimentation Environment 
 The experimentation environment is designed in a way that the data and 
processing is always independent of each other; most of the data is at rest and not 
continuously in server memory. System is designed with thinking that it could be 
expanded to create a real world product. System architecture, data storage strategy and 
network architecture is built with segmented design and functionality. Ticketing system 
helps in separating different tasks in different layers. This section will explain the process 
details, hardware and physical network details of the developed experimentation system.  
 At the process level experimentation is separated in to machine learning training, 
prediction and reverse engineering process.   
4.1 Machine learning training phase 
 Machine learning process is divided into 10 sub processes, given in the Table 2, 
Figure 2 shows a functional control flow of the machine learning process, these sub 
processes are tabularized with their computational complexity, network usage and data 
read/write cycles. 
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Figure 2 :  Machine Learning Phase Process Graph 
 
4.2 Machine learning prediction phase 
 Prediction phase is carried out after completion of machine learning 
training phase. Prediction uses already created model to perform classification on 
the given unclassified application.  Following Table 3 and Figure 3 shows sub-
processes in prediction phase. 
 















Low computation None Moderate Low time 
consumption 

















































Figure 3 : Machine Learning Prediction Phase Process Graph 
 
4.3 Malware reverse engineering/ manual analysis phase 
 Under this research a systematic stepwise Android malware analysis process is 
defined. Figure 4 gives flow of sub processes in manual analysis. Some part of this 
process is automated under AndroSandX. Few of the most important steps in Android 
malware analysis are finding important string, debugging application to find the code 
control flow, decompiling application of analyzing code, monitoring network to find 
malicious traffic, looking for background activity and analyzing any downloaded files. 
During manual analysis for debugging purpose malicious application is decompiled and 
recompiled in debug mode. This process required re-signing of Android apk file. 
Malware then can be installed on the Android virtual instance or real device. Main 
purpose of this process is to create signatures that will allow detection of malware using 





Figure 4 : Manual Malware Reverse Engineering Process Graph 
4.4 Network Architecture  
 The AndroSandX is designed with an industry style product, which could be 
easily judged from its network architecture. AndroSandX network architecture is created 
with security consideration, easy extension, easy data sharing and functional 
independence capabilities. Main component of the network are as follows: 
• Peripheral firewall 
• WiFi router / Access point 
• Gigabit switch 
• IPtable based firewall 
• AndroSandX main core processing server Dell R610 
• Android virtual instances 
• Android real devices 
• Network Attached storage for data backup 
• Hybrid drive mounted on drive mount 
• Malware analysis laptops/desktops 




4.4.1 Functional explanation of each component in the network 
4.4.1.1 Peripheral Firewall 
 Peripheral firewall protect the internal infrastructure from unauthorized access, 
also it allows only specific inbound open ports restricting exploitation of internal services 
like MongoDB. Firewall does not allow creation of new inbound connection to avoid 
Trojan backdoor infections. Peripheral rules for AndroSandX network are very restrictive 
and mostly will differ from a real world enterprise situation. In case of experimentation 
network peripheral firewall is running on TPLink TL-WR940N WiFi router.  
 
 
Figure 5 : Network Architecture Diagram 
4.4.1.2 WiFi router / Access point 
 WiFi access point is used to proved wireless connectivity to experimentation 
environment, device connected to WiFi network can go out to internet as well as they 
have unrestricted access to Network Attached Storage and AndroSandX. This allows 
using actual Android device for testing malware and provides connectivity from laptops 




4.4.1.3 Gigbit Switch 
 Switch provides network wired connection to all component in the network, 
allows traffic between server, router, WiFi access point, laptops and network attach 
storage. Helps in maintaining collision free layer 2 network data transfer, and keeps it 
fast.  
4.4.1.4 IPtable firewall 
 Iptable firewall is running on the Dell R610 server. IPtables helps in allowing and 
denying certain traffic, it helps in restricting access to only certain services running on 
the server. IPtables also performs an essential function of providing same network path 
for infected virtual Android devices to go out to internet, and restrict inbound 
connections.  
4.4.1.5 AndroSandX core processing server 
 AndroSandX is developed in Python, it uses MongoDB v3.2 as its database 
storage. Server runs on Ubuntu 14.04 server OS. In terms of hardware capability Dell 
R610 is having 24Gb RAM(6x4gb), 2x X5550 2.66 Ghz quad core processor capable of 
running 16 parallel threads, 4 Ethernet network interface cards [42].  
4.4.1.6 Android virtual instances 
 AndroSandX server runs multiple Android virtual instances that are used for 
malware installation and monitoring. Android 4.4 r2 x86 image is used. VirtualBox is 
used as virtualization software. Configured base image contains necessarily applications 
to connect with Cuckoo sandbox, root applications and Xposed framework required 
applications to hide presence of virtualization. Every instance of Android is allocated 
with 4 GB disk space and 512 Mb RAM, network is configured to be isolated from server 
and IP forwarding is used to provide connectivity to isolated network. 
4.4.1.7 Android real devices 
 AndroSandX also provide capability to connect and test applications on the real 
Android device. The devices can be directly attached to analysis PC over USB or they 
can be connected over WiFi. This provides more flexibility in manual analysis as any 




4.4.1.8 Network attached storage for data backup 
 Due to experimentation size, large amount of data is generated this data is not 
always possible to be stored on the server hard drive due to disk size constraint. Also the 
expansion cost of enterprise grade disk is too high to be afforded for the experimentation 
environment. Solution to these problems was achieved by setting up a network attached 
storage, this allows easy access to analysis data from local network as well as Seagate 
NAS allows url based cloud sharing. Routine backup for the system data and of 
MongoDB databases is highly required to avoid data loss, this is achieved by having 
routine backups of all databases and files to Seagate NAS. 
4.4.1.9 Hybrid drive mounted via USB3.0 HDD docking station 
 Core server is having an enterprise grade SATA hard drive of size 146 Gb, this 
drive is pretty much utilized by Ubuntu OS and other essential software installations. For 
storing MongoDB database and analysis files this core hard drive is not a good options as 
it limits easy backup and restore process. Having an externally mounted hybrid drives 
gives advantage of separating malware related data from core OS data, allows granular 
file/directory access control, easy backup/restore, easy hardware failure recovery, 
affordable high speed drive, larger disc space, easy mounting and OS changes. 
Considering all these advantages AndroSandX was designed to use external Seagate 1 TB 
SSHD hybrid drive to store MongoDB and analysis files.  
4.4.1.10 Malware analysis laptops/desktops 
 AndroSandX manual analysis is carried out on the separate network attached 
analysis machines. This proved flexibility to perform malware analysis using operating 
system customized for Android forensics, for example Santoku-OS or  MobiSec OS. This 
process isolates the possibility of directly infecting AndroSandX core server also 
provides flexibility to use virtual instance of analysis machine. Multiple analysis 
machines can be added to system allowing multiple researchers to work on AndroSandX 
tickets at the same time. Use of this architecture provides really a great flexibility to 




4.4.1.11 Cat 5e cable 
 For networking purpose and faster local network complete networking is done 
using good quality cat5e cable. 
4.4.1.12 Network device IP addresses and subnet details 
 Table 4 gives details bout the devices and their IP address, table also includes 
subnet and Internet connectivity details.  
Table 4 : Experimentation Lab Network Subnet and Address Details 
Device Name IP Subnet Direct access to 
internet 























Cuckoo service 192.168.56.1:2042 192.168.56.0/24 No (Only local 
access) 
MongoDB service 192.168.0.103:27017 192.168.0.0/24 No (Only local 
access) 





4.5 Firewall IP tables rules 
 IPtable based firewall is implemented at the AndroSandX server, this allows 
restricting access to unauthorized services. IPtables also restricts uncontrolled access to 
infected Android instance. Appendix B includes are the IPtable rules that are 
implemented. 
4.6 Development Platform and database storage solution 
 Python is used as the programming language in the AndroSandX. For the efficient 
development PyCharm[45] is used as an integrated development environment. For 
machine learning Scikit-learn[43] and Numpy[44] libraries are used. Scikit-learn allows 
easy implementation of classification and regression algorithms, Numpy is used in 
creating Numpy array of inputs for Scikit-learn functions. Python version 2.7 is used for 
the development.  
 For database storage non-relational database MongoDB v3.2 [39] is chosen. 
MongoDB provides great ease of storing document format data that is generated in the 
AndroSandX analysis process. Non-relational database provides great flexibility in 
modifying/adding fields in the documents that are non consistent in all applications. 
Considering the type and requirements of data structures in AndroSandX MongoDB 
provides the best compatibility.  
4.7 Application sample source and Threat Intel source details 
 All the applications used in the research are from VirusTotal.com [40], chosen 
applications are very well detected by VirusTotal as malware or benign. Malicious 
applications used have the detection ratio more than 10 and benign has detection ratio of 
0. VirusTotal applications are downloaded using Python API. VirusTotal provides a very 
trusted source of categorized application for sample set, and seems to be the best choice 
among the possible available sources.  
 For collecting threat intelligence 2 main online sources are used, VirusTotal.com 
and IPvoid.com [47]. Virustotal gives great details about the URL, domain being 
involved in any malicious activity. IPvoid provides details about IP address being flagged 
as blacklisted. AndroSandX extensively depend on these sources for collecting lot of 




automated analysis process. Few of the features submitted to machine learning algorithms 
directly depend on the threat intelligence gathered from VirusTotal and IPvoid.  
4.8 3rd party tools and platform in use 
Table 5 :  3rd Party Tool Version and Use Details 
Tool Version Details Details 
Ubuntu 14.04 Server OS 14.04 Ubuntu LTS Server Used for running 
AndroSandX application 
and hosting database server 
MongoDB MongoDB 3.2.9 Server as a database storage 
service 
Android 4.4 r2 x86 Android Kitkat – x86 Used for creating virtual 
instances of Android for 
malware analysis 
Santoku OS Santoku 0.5 – Lubuntu 
14.04 
Provides tool rich 
environment for manual 
analysis on malicious 
applications 
MobiSec MobiSec – Ubuntu Linux 
LTS 10.04 
Provides tool rich 
environment for manual 
analysis on malicious 
applications 
Cuckoo Droid Cuckoo 1.1 Provides malware 
sandboxing and analysis 
data collection tool 
Snort Snort 2.9 Intrusion detection system 
for testing signature 
performance 
Xposed Framework Xposed Version 2.7 Framework for hiding 





Apktool Apktool 2.0.0 De-compilation tool 
JDGUI JD-GUI 1.4.0 Graphical interface for 
reading .java extension files 
Android Studio Android Studio 2.1 Android application 
development and assistive 
tool, using mainly for 
debugging in this research 
TCPDump Tcpdump 4.7.3 Network packet capture tool 
Wireshark Wireshark 2.0.5 Network packet capture 
analyzer 
Droidmon Droidmon 2.0 Android Xposed framework 
based android logging and 
monitoring tool 
jarsigner -- Used in resigning modified 
Android application, used in 
recompiling and resigning 
application in debug mode 
ADB Android Build tool 23.0.0 Android command line 
access tool 
Drozer Drozer v2.3.4 Android penetration testing 






5 Programming details about AndroSandX 
5.1 Overview of layered architecture and its importance 
 Figure 6 gives and overview of the steps and flow followed in experimentation. 
AndroSandX has layer-wise separation of different functions. Each layer works on 
AndroSandX ticket and can only work on certain tickets, as there is a dependency of each 
layer on other for completion of tasks and data collection. Fundamentally the control flow 
of the system takes two paths one reaches to end state by achieving creation of machine 
learning model (training phase) and other path reaches end state after creation of SNORT 
signatures for possible predicted malware applications. First logical control flow goes 
through dynamic analysis, feature extraction and machine learning model training. 
Second logical control flow goes through dynamic analysis, feature extraction, prediction 
using existing machine learning model, perform manual analysis on the predicted 
malware and end state is achieved by creation of SNORT signature and testing it to detect 
the malware under manual analysis. Details about each layer and its functions are 
explained in further sections. 
 
5.2 MongoDB collection details  
 AndroSnadX data is stored using MongoDB, a non-relational database. The 
choice of such database storage is made as it allows runtime modification and addition of 
any new document element. Most of the data in analysis can be easily represented using 
key value pair with no pre defined data type, which can be very efficiently performed 
using MongoDB. AndroSandX has two different databases asx_core and analysis_core.  
 asx_core is used for storing all the AndroSandX ticket related date and other 
system required data. Following are the collections and data description under asx_core: 
Table 6 : MongoDB Collection Details 
Collection Name Data description 
vt_ipv_results Stores the threat intelligence collected data for every ticket to 
avoid repetitive analysis, also separates threat intelligence data 





analyzed_url_ip Stores the already analyzed url and ip to avoid repetitive query for 
same resource to threat intelligence collection sources 
static_var Sores the current ticket id for keeping count of total ticket and new 
ticket id assignment  
pcap_snort_log Stores formatted SNORT logs for each ticket 
new_tickets This collection stored the new ticket while application submission 
phase 
analysis_tickets Stores the AndroSandX ticket, this collection have documents that 










analysis_core data base is mainly used by Cuckoo Droid to add dynamic analysis related 
data. Some other data is also added using AndroSandX functions; the focus of this 
database is to store all the dynamic analysis extracted data. Name of the collection storing 
all dynamic analysis data is “analysis” some other Cuckoo Droid related collections are 
also part of this database.  
 
5.3 AndroSandX ticket structure and File storage directory details 
 AndroSandX uses ticket-based process to interact between different layers. The 
ticket has unique structure and all submitted applications are represented as ticket in the 
system. Figure 7 shows the skeleton of the AndroSandX ticket, it gives details about the 
top level document elements and their data types. Table 7 gives details about the file 
storage structure for the Analysis data, some of the raw data is stored on the disk first and 
then used for data abstraction to retrieve relevant data in later phases of analysis.  
  
Figure 7 : AndroSandX Ticket Object Variable Details 

































contains code for applications 
binary File Binary file of the applications 
dump.pcap  File Pcap file captured during dynamic 
analysis 
files Directory Analysis related extra files and 
intelligence used in manual analysis 
reports Directory Cuckoo Droid reports 
snort_logs Directory SNORT log directory for storing log and 
other SNORT related files while testing of 
network capture against SNORT rules 
asx_ai.pcap File Sorted Pcap file after reducing 
unnecessary conversations from raw pcap 
dex2jar_output Directory Java code for manual analysis extracted 
using dex2jar 
dump_sorted.pcap File Sorted dump.pcap file 
logs Directory Droidmon and AndroSandX related logs 
shots Directory Screenshots for the applications during 
dynamic analysis 
 
5.4 Layer Name: AndroSandX 
5.4.1 Details:  
 AndroSandX module is functionally the client side module in the system. Its 
function is to initiate an analysis process.  
5.4.2 Input:  
 Take file location / Folder location with tag malware/benign/analyze 
5.4.3 Output:  
 Create a new ticket object and store in the collection, also put the new ticket into 
new ticket queue for further processing. 
5.4.4 Function/Class details: 
5.4.4.1 def start_asx(file_apk)  
 This function initiates the global variable and ticket creation process. Global 




5.4.4.2 def create_new_ticket(file_path) 
 Create AndroSandX new ticket and fill in initial details. 
5.4.4.3 def hash_calculator(file_path) 
 Computes and return hash of submitted file. 
5.4.4.4 def init_global_var() 
 Initiates global variable object, this objects holds details about system wide global 
variables. Ticket count and queue for new tickets is stored in this variable.  
 
5.5 Layer Name: Layer_1 
5.5.1 Details: 
 Layer 1 works on new tickets, checks if the analysis is already done or not and 
then creates an AndroSandX analysis ticket request. This request is different than new 
ticket request as this separates client given new tickets from actual AndroSandX ticket, 
which allows refining, and more controlled rejection of unnecessary analysis request. 
Also hides direct database interaction from client side. Cuckoo analysis for each ticket is 
also initiated at this layer. 
 
5.5.2 Input:  
 Layer 1 takes new tickets as its input, it is designed to run in infinite looped 
thread. It continuously looks for new submitted requests and process them. 
5.5.3 Output: 
 Output of this layer is to create AndroSandX analysis ticket with properly tagging 
current layer and completion status. Also deletes new ticket once a permanent 




5.5.4 Function/Class details: 
5.5.4.1 class cuckoo_analysis_req(object) 
 Cuckoo Droid accepts class cuckoo_analysis_req object for running a dynamic 
analysis on given application. This class just has initialization function to create object 
that need to be passed to Cuckoo Droid.  
5.5.4.2 def layer_1_new_ticket_watcher() 
 This function continuously watch for new tickets submitted to AndroSandX and 
takes ownership of then and convert then in to AndroSandX tickets. 
5.5.4.3 def layer_1_init() 
 This function initializes layer 1, it looks for any previously pending tickets that 
need to be worked on before taking any new tickets.  
5.5.4.4 def layer_1_analysis() 
 Takes new pending tickets and check if they are already analyzed, if not submits 
to Cuckoo Droid. Once completed it proceeds with updating of AndroSandX ticket.  
5.5.4.5 layer_1.__main__ 
 Layer 1 main function runs in infinite loop to process any newly created analysis 
requests.  
 
5.6 Layer Name: Layer_2 
5.6.1 Details: 
 Layer 2 is responsible for collecting threat intelligence from different sources, it 
also perform some data abstraction to get relevant data for further analysis. Layer 2 takes 
ownership of ticket after Cuckoo Droid analysis is completed.  
5.6.2 Input: 
 Accepts ticket that has dynamic analysis completed. Also the sub-layer details 






 Layer 2 completes network data abstraction, apk details extraction and threat 
intelligence gathering from different source. Once all the data for a ticket under analysis 
is collected then it is stored in the AndroSandX ticket document. Also threat intelligence 
data is cached with indexing using hash. 
5.6.4 Function/Class details: 
5.6.4.1 def layer_2_A() 
 This function collects some primary details about the .apk file. Most of these are 
already been collected in the dynamic analysis. Some functioning is purposefully shifted 
to next layer and no more used at this level to increase efficiency.  
5.6.4.2 def get_apk_info_thread_fn(temp_ticket) 
 This is thread function for performing apk information extraction, allows parallel 
processing on multiple tickets simultaneously.  
5.6.4.3 def layer_2_B() 
 This function is designed to perform network data abstraction. It uses raw 
network captures to give out relevant network data abtraction. 
5.6.4.4 def get_network_conversations(temp_ticket_cuckoo_folder_id) 
 Extracts network end-to-end conversation details. It focuses on protocol and 
conversation streams.  
5.6.4.5 def layer_2_C() 
 This function controls the threat intelligence collection from different sources. 
IPVoid and Virustotal are used to collect most of the data. Also this function makes sure 
that cache is maintained to avoid request for already analyzed resource. URL, domain, IP 
related information is collected.  
5.6.4.6 def trusted_ip(ip) 
 Function returns true if the submitted IP is in the trusted list. This helps in 
avoiding collecting unnecessary information for Android services related IPs or any 




5.6.4.7 class virustotal(object) 
 Virustotal class provides required functions and variables for collecting threat 
intelligence from the Virustotal.com. Required access key and other hardcoded 
information is kept in the class global variable. 
5.6.4.7.1 virustotal.__init__(self,url_or_ip,parameter) 
 Takes threat intelligence collection resource and performs resource analysis 
request to Virustotal, if resource is already analyzed then this step is skipped. Going 
ahead the results are collected from the Virustotal and stored in the AndroSandX ticket. 
5.6.4.8 class ipvoid(object) 
 IPvoid class provides functionality to query IPvoid service to gather blacklist 
status for given IP. Extensive html parsing is performed in this class.  
5.6.4.8.1 ipvoid.__init__(self, ip_address) 
 Initialized required class variables and requests for IP blacklist status to 
IPvoid.com 
5.6.4.8.2 ipvoid.get_ipVoid_results(self) 
 Fetches and returns the IPvoid results for the ipvoid object stored IP.  
5.6.4.9 class ipvoid_parser(HTMLParser) 
 This is a derived class for providing HTML parsing functionality.  
5.6.4.10 layer_2.__main__ 
 Controls the flow of sub sections of layer 2 for granular control. Provides option 
to run sub functions or run complete layer 2 analysis. 
5.7 Layer Name: Layer_3  
5.7.1 Details: 
 This layer performs execution of SNORT against the captured network traffic for 
an application during dynamic analysis. The purpose of this layer to check if the existing 






 Takes each ticket completing the layer 3 analysis as the input.  
5.7.3 Output: 
 Any SNORT triggered alerts are parsed and stored in the AndroSandX ticket. 
5.7.4 Function/Class details: 
5.7.4.1 def execute_snort() 
 Creates a queue of tickets are that ready for layer 3 analysis and passes SNORT 
execution. Ticket are processed with 10 parallel thread each initiating different instance 
of SNORT. 
5.7.4.2 def snort_exec_thread(ticket) 
 Instantiates the SNORT instance and passed the PCAP for detection. Any alerts 
that are generated during the process are stored and parsed to store in AndroSandX ticket. 
Parsed field includes signature id, group id, summary of alert, classification of attack 
vector, priority of alert, time stamp, source IP destination IP. 
5.7.4.3 layer_3.__main__ 
 Main function of layer 3 simply initiates the layer process.  
5.8 Layer Name: Layer_4_a 
5.8.1 Details 
 ‘Layer_4_a’ is responsible for machine learning feature extraction; this layer is 
one of the most crucial in terms of functioning of AndroSandX. This layers does a lot of 
data abstraction and rule based feature value calculations. This layer also performs some 
threat intelligence gathering based on the feature requirements. Also utilizes cache to 
avoid repetitive request for same resource.  
5.8.2 Input 
 This layer takes tickets that has already completed layer 3 analysis and have all 
the SNORT logs parsed. This layer requires ticket to have all the necessary data stored in 




sure that it will only work on ticket that have Droidmon logs captured, this is required to 
have a valid set of feature data for machine learning.  
5.8.3 Output 
 This layer computes all the 153 features for each AndroSandX ticket submitted to 
it, and it stores it in ticket document.  
5.8.4 Function/Class details: 
5.8.4.1 class ai_features(object) 
 Provides a 153 machine learning feature extraction functions. Defines a data 
structure to hold features for each ticket. Each ticket needs different instance of this 
object to extract features. It has total of 153 distinct features and also requires threat 
intelligence collection from IPvoid and Virustotal. 
5.8.4.2 layer_4_a.__main__ 
 Simply reads all the AndroSandX tickets that are ready for layer_4_a analysis and 
submits to ai_feature class object initialization to extract feature set.  
 
5.9 Layer Name: Layer_4_b 
5.9.1 Details: 
 Layer_4_b focuses on machine learning and prediction functions. Total of 153 
features are extracted, all feature are stored as float data type. Most of the features are 
having 0 or 1 value. Each AndroSandX ticket is worked on to generate and store the 
required features. Any required threat intelligence collection is also carried out during 
feature extraction. There are two sub tasks at this layer, first is training and creation of 
machine learning models and second is prediction phase. Machine learning classification 
and regression algorithms are used, layer provides storing and restoring of machine 
learning models.  
5.9.2 Input: 
 This layer works on tickets that have completed layer_4_a analysis. Utilizes data 





 Multiple outputs are achieved at this layer, main goal is to predict the 
classification of a submitted application. While achieving that machine learning models 
and feature set creation also takes place.  
5.9.4 Function/Class details: 
5.9.4.1 def create_feature_input() 
 Works on each of the AndroSandX ticket; collects data stored in analysis ticket 
and Cuckoo Droid generated data. Total of 153 features are extracted, and stored in the 
AndroSandX ticket. This function also collects any additional threat intelligence related 
data that might be required by for extracting feature.  
5.9.4.2 def save_classifier() 
 Once all the required features are extracted and stored for all the learning phase 
applications then machine learning algorithm Random Forest is used to generate an AI 
model. save_classifier functions save this model to disk space for later use.  
5.9.4.3 def restore_classifier() 
 This function reads back previously stored machine learning model. Restored 
models are further used for performing prediction.  
5.9.4.4 def save_csv() 
 This functions save the comma separated values for prediction data and other data 
like feature importance.  
5.9.4.5 def create_ai_model() 
 Creates machine-learning model using Random Forest algorithm. Model over-
fitting is checked at this function. Created model is generated under a global object of 
sklearn, which is used by other functions to perform classification of applications and 
storing of model.  
5.9.4.6 def predict() 
 predict function performs classification and regression using the extracted 




5.9.4.7 def score() 
 Computes accuracy and different efficiency matix of machine learning model 
created at this layer.  
5.9.4.8 layer_4_b.__main__ 
 Mainly orchestrates the different functions performed at this layer.  
5.10 Layer Name: Layer_5 
5.10.1 Details: 
 Layer 5 is designed for assisting in manual analysis and reverse engineering of 
malicious android applications. This layer provides utilities and tool integrations such as 
repacking of apk, signing of apk, getting JAVA code for applications. Provides easy and 
quick pre manual analysis assistance.  
5.10.2 Input: 
 Takes in the AndroSandX ticket to be used for performing manual analysis, no 
other input is required. 
5.10.3 Output: 
 There is no defined output for this layer, multiple sub functions do achieve output 
like giving out signed apk, application code extraction. Ultimate goal at this layer is to 
assist in manual analysis, increase efficiency and store user created SNORT signatures to 
AndroSandX ticket.  
5.10.4 Function/Class details: 
5.10.4.1 def get_apktool_info(temp_ticket) 
 Function utilizes Apktool to extract code, repack apk in debug mode. Also 
dex2jar and apk signer applications are also done.  
5.10.4.2 def get_app_name(aoktool_output_folder) 






 Simply orchestrates the different functions at this layer.  
 
5.11 Utility function: mongodb_ASX 
5.11.1 Details: 
 mongodb_ASX is an utility module providing different database access class and 
functions to delete/reinitialize MongoDB collections.  
5.11.2 Function/Class details: 
5.11.2.1 class my_mdb(object) 
 my_mdb class object initiates connection to multiple MongoDB collections.  
5.11.2.2 mongodb_ASX.__main__ 
 Reinitialize all MongoDB collections by invoking drop_all, create_all sub 
functions.  
 
5.12 Utility functions: object_ASX 
5.12.1 Details: 
 Provides AndroSandX ticket object class and global variable class. Allows taking 
document from database and convert it into object and work on it, makes the functioning 
and modifications very easy.  
5.12.2 Function/Class details: 
5.12.2.1 class ticket(object) 
 Defines the AndroSandX ticket. Class functions allow printing class or getting a 




5.12.2.2 class global_var(object) 
 Global variable used to share data between multiple layers in the AndroSandX 
system. This class object allows access to global variable stored in database and allows 






6.1 Choice of machine learning algorithm  
 Over all machine learning algorithms can be categorized into 3 main category, 
supervised learning, unsupervised learning and reinforcement learning. Choosing one 
of these completely determined based on what sort of data is available for training 
phase. If the output state and distinct input features are available then the supervised 
learning might be best fit. In other case if the learning data do not have any certain 
output state defined already then unsupervised learning would be a good approach. In 
a situation where learning data set is not available and machine learning models are 
required to be built based on ongoing data input then reinforcement learning is best 
fit. Reinforcement learning is trial and error based approach, and system learns from 
past decision gaining knowledge every time it makes any decision.  
 One more important decision to be made during choice of algorithm is either use 
regression to get a continuous output value or have a classification-based approach. In 
regression, the output of system is a continuous value. Depending on the parameters 
output can be some what clustered in specific regions on output ranges. Classification 
on the other hand has certain defined classes, output of machine learning model need 
to predict one of the predefined class as output. In case of this research, classification 
based algorithms are more relevant as the results are expected to be of only two 
types/class. In this research application can be member of either “Benign” class or 
“Malware” class. Though to prove the justification of use of classification algorithms 
certain regression algorithm results are also presented. 
 Some of the well-known machine learning algorithms and the reason for choosing 
or rejecting them for this research is stated bellow [48]. 
6.1.1 Linear Regression  
 Linear regression is trying to find a linear relation which best fits all the 
given data to given output in minimum error in predicting output. An attempt is 
made to find a polynomial function, which suitably represents the input to output 
relation. Linear regression is not a good approach in this research as the input data 




be just either “Malware” or “Benign”. The type of the data generated in research 
and expected output is not linear or not expecting a linearly distributed output so 
this approach is discarded for research.  
6.1.2 Decision Tree 
 Decision tree is mostly used for performing classification-based problems. 
Feature set is grouped in to multiple subsets to predict the output based on 
learning data set. Decision tree works very well in case of mixed data set having 
continuous and binary feature data. Decision tree is well suited for this research, 
though a better accuracy implementation “Random Forest” is used which at its 
core use decision tree.  
6.1.3 SVM (Support Vector Machine) 
 SVM is a graph plotting based algorithm, each of the feature is plotted as a 
dimension in n-dimensional space where n is the number of features. Plotting 
allows distribution of sample data in n dimensional space and next step would be 
to find a unique plane that separates the samples in a most distinct and efficient 
manner. The plane becomes the equation that predicts the class of the input 
sample. SVM is a supervised learning algorithm. In this research SVM do not 
give good result because the features have binary value.   
6.1.4 Naïve Bayes 
 Naïve Bayes machine learning algorithm uses Bayes theorem. Works very 
well with supervised learning and classification requiring problems. In security 
industry Naïve Bayes and Random Forest are the two competing algorithms, 
based on the data set each gives better accuracy. For the research decision was 
made to use Random Forest over Naïve Bayes algorithm. 
6.1.5 KNN (K-Nearest Neighbors) 
 KNN is a regression and classification algorithm, works on finding votes 
of the K neighbors. In this research KNN is not that suitable as the data is binary 
resulting into too much of clustering in one region. Further the combination of 




6.1.6 Random Forest 
 Random Forest is an ensemble of decision trees. Multiple decision tree 
votes for the final classification. A small sub set of features is chosen at random to 
create a decision trees, all these decision tree then vote for the outcome of total 
forest. Random Forest works very well with mixed data, in this research features 
are mixture of binary and float data type. Random Forest is the most suited 
algorithm for this research.  
 
6.2 Regression and classification 
 Both regression and classification based statistics are presented here for the data 
set used under this research. One of the most important factors in building machine 
learning model is to avoid over-fitting and obtain a good cross-validation score [49]. 
Cross validation score indicates how generalized the modes are for any unknown data 
set. This research was able to achieve a cross valuation score of 0.98 for Random 
Forest based classification which a very much an indication of a successful model 
building. Total of 500 trees are used in the forest, which seems to create fairly 
accurate models.  
 
 
============== Random_forest Model building statistics =============== 
Classification : 
RandomForestClassifier(bootstrap=True, compute_importances=None, 
    criterion=gini, max_depth=None, max_features=auto, 
    min_density=None, min_samples_leaf=1, min_samples_split=2, 
    n_estimators=500, n_jobs=1, oob_score=False, random_state=None, 






   max_depth=None, max_features=auto, min_density=None, 
   min_samples_leaf=1, min_samples_split=2, n_estimators=500, 








6.3 Details about total sample set – Collection, Threat intelligence, 
confidence and cleaning 
  Choosing the right sample set for research is very important. It is 
important to use correctly classified learning data set. In this research sample set of 
Android application is used which is pre classified as malware and benign. Such 
sample set need to be obtained from a trusted source, in this case it VirusTotal. 
VirusTotal accumulates analysis from multiple well know industry leading anti-virus 
products. For this research total of 15000 applications were downloaded. Out of 
which after running through AndroSandX and cleaning based of availability of 
completeness of behavioral data subset of 4858 application is choose for building 
machine learning models. This 4858 application includes 3083 malicious applications 
and 1775 benign applications. All the chosen applications have all the possible 
analysis data available allowing accurate feature extraction.  
 Collection of all samples is done using VirusTotal which is very trusted and 
accurate source of malware sample collection. Other important external data 
collection involves threat intelligence collection. During the feature extraction and 
multiple analysis stages threat intelligence data collection is carried out. For 
collection of threat intelligence two resources VirusTotal and IPVoid are used. These 
two websites are highly reputed and hold open source threat intelligence data 
collected by researchers all across the world. IPVoid is used for collection the IP 
address blacklist status. VirusTotal is used for collection information about hashes of 
files, IP, URL and domain related malicious activity.  
 Collected data from the threat intelligence source is either HTML formatted 
webpage or JSON objects. Collected data need parsing or cleaning to gather required 
data. Data cleaning and storing is done using Python classes designed under 
AndroSandX for threat intelligence collection.  
 
6.4 Positive sample, Negative samples and analysis  
 During the collection of samples from VirusTotal, a decision was made that the 
malware samples chosen for research should have 10+ hit on VirusTotal. That 




virus detection engines. And the benign applications will be the one with 0 match on 
the VirusTotal.  These conditions are fairly logical and accurate considering an 
assumption that the uploaded sample is not very new, allowing anti-virus vendors to 
perform research and classify as malware or benign application.  
 
6.5 AI feature collection details 
 This section explains detail and logic behind collection of each feature used for 
building machine learning models. These features and their correct extraction is the 
heart of the research, complete success of the research is dependent on choosing right 
features. 
6.5.1 'know_adware' 
  This features detects the already know Android malware based of the 
signature and key strings present in the apk file. Mainly detects “Umeng” and 
“AirPush” adware. This list of adware is extensible and can be made more 
through by adding more string match. 
6.5.2 'dangerous_permissions': 
 This feature is based on the Cuckoo Droid defined dangerous permissions. 
Triggers on use of combination of highly suspicious permission in manifest file. 
6.5.3 'dynamic_code':  
 Looks for Cuckoo Droid detection of dynamic code in the Android 
application, dynamic code can be in the form of external download or pre packed 
jar files.  
6.5.4 'known_malware_sig_string':  
 Feature is based on the Cuckoo Droid malware signature detection, mainly 
looks for “sandrorat”, “androrat”, iBanking” malware signatures.  
6.5.5 'use_of_native_code':  




6.5.6 'hiden_payload':  
 Detects the hidden payload in the apk file. Applications hide the payload 
by different methods, payload my inclide image files, jar, apk files and other 
native precompiled files.  
6.5.7 'use_of_android_packer':  
 Detects use of packer to obfuscate the code and avoid malware analysis. 
Packer makes the manual and automated analysis difficult. String match is 
completely evaded by use of packer.  
6.5.8 'use_of_reflection_code':  
 Java reflection[50] gives an ability to determine the environment though 
checking for available APIs. This technique is very well used by Android 
malware to detect the sandbox environment and the possible updates on the 
device. This technique is very well used to hide the true functionality of malware 
from automated malware analysis system, which do not have all the API calls 
available as that of actual Android devices.  
6.5.9 'aborted_broadcast': 
 This feature looks for use of Android java functions “void abortBroadcast 
()”. This function allows application to terminate the further broadcast receiving 
by other applications. This could allow receiving of SMS and other broadcast 
messages silently and hindering user awareness of any such activity.  
6.5.10 'contains_another_apk': 
 Detects the presence of another executable apk file inside the application 
apk. Usually application can use “DexClassLoader” built in java class to load the 
class files from non compiled apk and jar files. This allows runtime dynamic code 
loading.  
6.5.11 'contains_arm_binary':  
 Detects presence of ARM compiled binary, this can be ran on the ARM 
devices. This is very much using a kernel module and native applications, a good 
example would be use of TCPDUMP binary to capture all network traffic on 




6.5.12 'contains_dex':  
 Detects the presence of Dalvik executable, dex file can be executed by the 
Android application as the external code.  
6.5.13 'contains_jar': 
 Detects the presence of jar file. Jar files contains the compiled java code in 
terms of .class files. Malicious application can download or package malicious 
classes and functions as a .jar files. 
6.5.14 'contains_so': 
 .so file stands for shared object files. These are dynamically linked code 
files. It allows modification or download of external code at runtime. Malware 
authors can use this technique to avoid detection.  
6.5.15 'device_admin_granted': 
 Detects the use of admin access on the Android device. Malware authors 
can use the admin level execution to steal data from other applications and 
perform system level actions.  
6.5.16 'execution_of_shell_command': 
 Detect the execution of Linux shell commands.  
6.5.17 'device_fingerprinting': 
 This feature detects the applications attempt to gather device specific data 
and network service provider related data. Mostly of the time device 
fingerprinting involves gathering information about SIM card, country locations, 
IMEI number, mobile network service provider details. These techniques allow 
malware authors to determine possible exploit vectors to be used.  
6.5.18 'installed_new_application': 
 Detects if the applications installed another application.  
6.5.19 'queried_account_info': 
 Detects if the application queried for user accounts, which mainly includes 
users Google account details.  
6.5.20 'queried_installed_apps': 




6.5.21 'accessed_private_information':  
 Private information includes contact information, files on storage, photos 
and document files.  
6.5.22 'audio_recording':  
 Detects audio recording by application, this technique is used by Android 
malware to eavesdrop on victim.  
6.5.23 'registered_new_receiver_at_runtime':  
 Android receivers are used to receive system level broadcasts. Runtime 
registering of receiver indicates application attempting to intercept activities or 
system actions that it did not declared in manifest file.  
6.5.24 'sent_sms':  
 Detect the application sending sms. 
6.5.25 'stoped_processes':  
 Detects if application stopped any other processes.  
6.5.26 'uses_location':  
 Detects the applications attempting to get current physical location of the 
device.  
6.5.27 'using_camera': 
 Detects the use of camera by application. 
6.5.28 'creates_exe': 
 Detects if the application creates an .exe file on the Android device. This 
technique is seen from APT (advance persistent threat) adversaries. Malware 
authors try to compromise other Windows machines on the corporate network 
though compromised Android devices, this is very sophisticated technique of 
lateral movement in the network.  
6.5.29 'use_of_ICMP_request': 
 Detects the application sending ICMP requests, this is useful in 




6.5.30 'use_of_IRC':  
 Detect the use of network communication protocol IRC (internet relay 
chat). IRC is very well used in the malware command and control mechanism.  
6.5.31 'use_of_SMTP': 
 Detects use of SMTP (Simple Mail transfer Protocol), though used by 
normal email applications SMTP is widely used to perform data exfiltration.  
6.5.32 'cryptography_used': 
 Detects the use of cryptographic functions in the application. 
6.5.33 'crypto_algo_DES': 
 Detects the use of cryptographic algorithm DES. DES is a block cipher. 
6.5.34 'crypto_algo_AES':  
 Detects the use of cryptographic algorithm AES. AES is a block cipher. 
6.5.35 'crypto_algo_RC4':  
 Detects the use of cryptographic algorithm RC4. RC4 is a stream cipher.  
6.5.36 'Use_of_Shared_preference':  
 Shared preferences allows android application to store data persistently 
even after the closing of applications. This feature detects use of shared 
preferences by application. 
6.5.37 'Shared_preference_contain_URL': 
 Detects the presence of URL string in the shared preference, this technique 
can be used by malware authors to download malicious code or file containing 
commands and configurations.  
6.5.38 'shared_preference_URL_flaged_by_virustotal': 
 Detects if VirusTotal flags URL stored in shared preferences. Most of the 
time these URLs lead to download of malicious applications.  
6.5.39 'apk_accessed_from_storage':  
 Detects the accessing of APK file from storage. Malicious applications 
most of the times downloads malicious application apk file to storage and then 




6.5.40 'zip_accessed_from_storage':  
 Detects accessing of zip  file form storage.  
6.5.41 'jar_accessed_from_storage': 
 Detects accessing of jar file from storage.  
6.5.42 'accessed_so_file': 
 Detects the access of .so files from the storage. 
6.5.43 'shared_preference_contains_URL_to_apk_file': 
 Detects if the URL is pointing to a apk file.  
6.5.44 'internet_permission': 
 Applications asked for internet permissions. 
6.5.45 'write_external_storage': 
 Applications asked for access to writing to external storage. 
6.5.46 'change_wifi_state':  
 Application can change the WiFi state. Can start and stop WiFi, and detect 
presence of connections.  
6.5.47 'access_fine_location': 
 Can query for accurate location of the device. This allows access to GPS 
coordinate.  
6.5.48 'access_coarse_location':  
 Can access network based location, this location coordinate are not highly 
accurate but still accurate enough to point device to a 500 meters area.  
6.5.49 'wake_lock': 
 Allows application to keep the device awake and keep running processes. 
6.5.50 'read_history_bookmark':  
 Allow permission to read users browser bookmark history. 
6.5.51 'write_history_bookmark': 
 Allow permission to write user bookmark history. 
6.5.52 'read_phone_state': 





 Allow permission to access camera. 
6.5.54 'read_external_storage': 
 Allow permission to read external storage. 
6.5.55 'read_logs': 
 Allow application to read system logs. 
6.5.56 'read_calendar': 
 Allow application to read user calendar giving access to user schedules 
and meeting details.  
6.5.57 'write_calendar':  
 Allow permission to write to user calendar. 
6.5.58 'mount_unmount_filesystem': 
 Allow permission to mount and unmounts file system. 
6.5.59 'install_uninstall_shortcut': 
 Allow application to install and uninstall shortcut on main screens. Allow 
hiding malicious installs from user.  
6.5.60 'download_without_notification': 
 Allows applications to download other files in background and without 
notification of consent from user.  
6.5.61 'modify_secure_system_setting':  
 Allow application to modify system’s security related settings. 
6.5.62 'directly_install_application':  
 Allow application to install other applications without user consent. 
Allows malware author to download and install malicious applications.  
6.5.63 'modify_phone_state':  
 Allow modifying options like silent, network connection strength, GSM 
operator details, call details and other telephony service details.  
6.5.64 'write_accesspoint_proxy_setting': 





 Allows application to turn the phone on and off. 
6.5.66 'create_bluetooth_connection': 
 Allows application to create new Bluetooth connection, can be used by 
malware to intercept Bluetooth devices around the compromised phone.  
6.5.67 'intercept_outgoing_call': 
 Allows intercepting outbound calls from devices. 
6.5.68 'directly_call_phone_numbers': 
 Allow application to directly make phone calls without user consent. 
6.5.69 'access_superuser':  
 Allow application to access superuser permission. 
6.5.70 'kill_background_process':  
 Allow application to kill background process.  
6.5.71 'read_contact': 
 Allow application to read contacts on device.  
6.5.72 'receive_WAP_push_message': 
 Application can receive WAP push message received by device.  
6.5.73 'get_account': 
 Allow application to access account details on the device.  
6.5.74 'manage_account_and_passwords':  
 Allow access to user accounts and passwords.  
6.5.75 'disable_key_lock': 
 Application can disable key lock on mobile device which allows user to 
avoid unintended access to device.  
6.5.76 'access_download_manager': 
 Allow application to access download manager, this allows scheduling 
download if other downloads are in progress.  
6.5.77 'control_vibrator': 





 Allow application to send SMS. 
6.5.79 'restart_packages': 
 Application can restart loaded packages.  
6.5.80 'write_sms_mms': 
 Allows application to create or modify SMS, MMS. 
6.5.81 'read_sms_mms': 
 Allow application to read SMS and MMS received by device.  
6.5.82 'receive_sms':  
 Allows application to receive SMS receiving broadcasts.  
6.5.83 'change_network_state':  
 Allow application to change state of network, this allows getting details 
about network details and perform connection modification.  
6.5.84 'interact_accross_user_full': 
 Allows applications to use all resources available to user.  
6.5.85 'broadcast_sticky': 
 Allows to receive the intent for broadcast activity even after completion of 
broadcast.  
6.5.86 'write_setting': 
 Allows modification of system settings.  
6.5.87 'get_running_task': 
 Access all the reunning tasks on device.  
6.5.88 'system_level_alert':  
 Allows applications to receive and read system level alrts.  
6.5.89 'receive_boot_completed': 
 Application can detect boot completion message. 
6.5.90 'MAC_address':  
 Application has permission to access device MAC address. 
6.5.91 'Network_Operator':  




6.5.92 'Device_ID':  
 Application has permission to get device ID. 
6.5.93 'Sim_serial_Number': 
 Application has permission to access SIM serial number.  
6.5.94 'Sim_Operator_Name':  
 Application has permission to access SIM operator name. 
6.5.95 'get_network_country':  
 Application has permission to get network country code. 
6.5.96 'sim_iso_country':  
 Application has permission to get SIM ISO country code. 
6.5.97 'get_line_number': 
 Application has permission to get the telephone number of the device. 
6.5.98 'screen_On': 
 Application has permission to turn screen on. 
6.5.99 'screen_off':  
 Application has permission to turn device screen off. 
6.5.100'package_added':  
 Application has permission to add new package. 
6.5.101'package_removed':  
 Application has permission to removed installed package. 
6.5.102'SMS_received': 
 Application has permission to check received SMS broadcast. 
6.5.103'SMS_delivered': 
 Application has permission to check if SMS was delivered. 
6.5.104'device_admin_enabled': 
 Application has permission to check admin access on device.  
6.5.105'boot_completed': 





 Application has permission to check if the charging chord is connected. 
6.5.107'action_power_disconnected':  
 Application has permission to check if the charging chard was 
disconnected.  
6.5.108'battery': 
 Application has permission to check state of battery. 
6.5.109'user_present': 
 Application has permission to check if certain user is present on the 
device. 
6.5.110'media_changes': 
 Application has permission to check media changes on device. 
6.5.111'head_set_detect':  
 Application has permission to check headset detected status. 
6.5.112'proxy_change':  
 Application has permission to check proxy changes. 
6.5.113'connectivity_change': 
 Application has permission to check connectivity changes. 
6.5.114'baidu_silent_install':  
 Application have custom permission biadu silent install  
6.5.115'baidu_detect_root': 
 Application have custom application permission to detect if device is 
rooted. 
6.5.116'cypto_function':  
 Application makes function call or have a static method to perform 
cryptographic functions. 
6.5.117'contact_read':  
 Application makes function call or have a static method for reading 





 Application makes function call or have a static method to access camera. 
6.5.119'bookmark': 
 Application makes function call or have a static method to access or 
modify bookmarks. 
6.5.120'location': 
 Application makes function call or have a static method to access location 
of device. 
6.5.121'send_sms':  
 Application makes function call or have a static method to send SMS. 
6.5.122'location_wallpaper_readlogs':  
 Application have functional calls which indicates it call access location, 
set wallpaper and read system calls, such combination of calls are unexpected 
unless performing malicious activity.  
6.5.123'credential_killProcess_audioRecord_camera_location_internet': 
 Application have function calls that indicates potential malicious behavior, 
application access credentials, kill process, record audio, use camera, get location 
and have access to internet.  
6.5.124# Network forensics 
6.5.125'IP_address_blacklisted':  
 Detects if the IP address related to application’s network communication 
are blacklisted.  
6.5.126'IP_address_belongs_high_severity_country':  
 Detects if the IP communication is destined to IP address in high severity 
countries.  
6.5.127'IP_address_hosting_flaged_url_on_Virustotal':  
 Detects if IP address involved in communication have malicious URL 





 Detects if the IP address involved in communication have malicious file 
hosted on as per VirusTotal reports.  
6.5.129'URL_flaged_on_virustotal':  
 Detects if the URL accessed from application is flagged on VirusTotal. 
6.5.130'ethernet_frames':  
 This has a floating data type, it simple counts the number of Ethernet 
frames transferred by application during dynamic analysis.  
6.5.131'ethernet_bytes':  
 Number of Ethernet data bytes transferred during dynamic analysis.  
6.5.132'arp_frames': 
 Number of ARP frames during the dynamic analysis. 
6.5.133'arp_bytes': 
 Number of ARP data bytes transferred during dynamic analysis. 
6.5.134'ip_frames': 
 Number of IP protocol frames during dynamic analysis. 
6.5.135'ip_bytes': 
 Number of IP protocol data transfer bytes during dynamic analysis. 
6.5.136'udp_frames': 
 Number of UDP frames during dynamic analysis.  
6.5.137'udp_bytes': 
 Number of UDP protocol data transfer bytes during dynamic analysis. 
6.5.138'tcp_frames': 
 Number of TCP frames transferred during the dynamic analysis. 
6.5.139'tcp_bytes':  
 Number of TCP bytes transferred during the dynamic analysis. 
6.5.140'dns_frames':  
 Number of DNS frames transferred during dynamic analysis. 
6.5.141'dns_bytes': 





 Number of IRC frames transferred during the dynamic analysis. 
6.5.143'irc_bytes': 
 Number of IRC data transfer bytes during dynamic analysis. 
6.5.144'smtp_frames': 
 Number of SMTP frame transferred during the dynamic analysis. 
6.5.145'smtp_bytes': 
 Number of SMTP data transfer bytes during the dynamic analysis. 
6.5.146'udp_uploaded_data': 
 Total amount of UDP data uploaded. 
6.5.147'udp_downloaded_data': 
 Total amount of UDP data downloaded during dynamic analysis. 
6.5.148'tcp_uploaded_data': 
 Total amount of TCP data uploaded during the dynamic analysis. 
6.5.149'tcp_downloaded_data':  
 Total amount of TCP data downloaded during the dynamic analysis.  
6.5.150'udp_coversation_average_data_transfer_rate': 
 Data transfer rate for UDP conversation during the dynamic analysis. 
6.5.151'tcp_coversation_average_data_transfer_rate':  
 Data transfer rate for TCP conversation during the dynamic analysis. 
6.5.152'snort_alert_for_malaware_related_activity': 
 Detection of malware related activity using latest SNORT malware 
signatures. 
6.5.153'snort_alert_for_exploit_kit_activity': 
 Detection of exploit kit related activity using latest SNORT signatures. 
6.5.154'snort_high_severity_alert':  
 Triggering of high severity signature in by SNORT on traffic captured 





6.6 Learning data 
 A learning data set is a set of samples that have been already analyzed and 
classified. Sample set contains trusted well-analyzed and cleaned feature set samples. 
These applications are passed through analysis process to obtain the required feature 
set. After cleaning samples for availability of all the features, there were 3083 
malicious applications and 1775 benign applications left.  
 After the learning phase and machine learning model creation, a test sample set of 
509 applications is submitted for analysis. These 509 applications have 156 malware 
and 353 benign applications. This sample set is submitted to evaluate the prediction 
and classification efficiency of trained models.  
 
6.7 Prediction sample and prediction results 
 Following data set array shows the predicted output for the classification and 
regression of sample set. Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Random Forest Algorithm 
prediction data set is given bellow.  Total sample set length is 509 and 1 in output 




Support Vector Machine Classification output: 
 
Figure 9 : Support Vector Machine Classification output  
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Random Forest Classification output: 
 




Random Forest Regression output: 
[0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 





Figure 11 : Random Forest Classification output 
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 0.014  0.96   0.  0.  0.03   0.63   0.002  0.628  0.  0.42   0. 
 0.208  0.012  0.006  0.056  0.176  0.  0.  0.07   0.  0.006  0. 
 0.  0.112  0.222  0.016  0.  0.03   0.042  0.032  0.  0.072 
 0.026  0.234  0.002  0.028  0.  0.006  0.008  0.  0.  0.002 
 0.03   0.006  0.  0.654  0.014  0.044  0.062  0.  0.01   0.012 
 0.724  0.  0.002  0.954  0.028  0.06   0.068  0.  0.  0.04   0.65 
 0.168  0.04   0.114  0.132  0.016  0.  0.  0.  0.  0.  0. 
 0.02   0.  0.006  0.046  0.002  0.128  0.  0.  0.026  0.008 
 0.102  0.006  0.978  0.024  0.  0.084  0.  0.044  0.136  0.162 
 0.032  0.222  0.014  0.522  0.004  0.006  0.008  0.06   0.242  0.066  0.2 
 0.14   0.  0.268  0.228  0.036  0.03   0.052  0.002  0.004  0.032 
 0.066  0.006  0.  0.06   0.03   0.016  0.142  0.006  0.042  0.322 






Actual Sample Set classification: 
Following data array shows the actual classification of the applications. Out of 509 
applications submitted for analysis 156 were classified as “Malware” and 353 were 
“Benign” applications.  
 
Figure 12 : Actual Sample Set Classification 
 
 
6.8 Feature Importance: 
 In total 153 features were used as input for machine learning algorithm. After the 
prediction to validate that few features are not over weighted cross validation score 
was calculated. Cross validation score indicates successful creation of AI models and 
to what extent models can accurately predict unknown samples. Also cross validation 
score indicate if the model is over fitted. Over fitting of model is an indication of 
some feature set values always gets priority an predication is always result into same 
classification.  
 Feature importance is way to check if certain features are not over weighted. 
Table shows importance of each feature out of total 1.000. Feature importance value 
indicates how much each feature contributes during the prediction using created 
model. 
Table 8 : Feature Importance Values 
Feature Name Feature Feature 
[1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 





2000 B: 1000] 
Importance [M: 
3083 B: 1775] 
SMS_delivered 0.000225 0.000274 
modify_secure_system_setting 0.000191 0.000234 
device_fingerprinting 0.007239 0.006053 
tcp_coversation_average_data_transfer_rate 0.006215 0.006865 
screen_off 0.003100 0.002495 
Use_of_Shared_preference 0.005814 0.006033 
receive_sms 0.004008 0.003553 
broadcast_sticky 0.000913 0.000926 
install_uninstall_shortcut 0.010185 0.009681 
head_set_detect 0.000247 0.000224 
get_line_number 0.003943 0.003280 
disable_key_lock 0.001576 0.001953 
battery 0.006140 0.006452 
use_of_ICMP_request 0.000166 0.000187 
location 0.006495 0.006517 
wake_lock 0.002782 0.002799 
smtp_frames 0.000281 0.000284 
contact_read 0.080827 0.082306 
accessed_private_information 0.001367 0.001497 
tcp_bytes 0.008204 0.008201 
tcp_frames 0.006546 0.007287 




registered_new_receiver_at_runtime 0.008681 0.012259 
contains_dex 0.000000 0.000000 
read_sms_mms 0.004153 0.004716 




contains_jar 0.000000 0.000000 
manage_account_and_passwords 0.000790 0.000925 
receive_WAP_push_message 0.000599 0.000451 
directly_call_phone_numbers 0.001595 0.001538 
screen_On 0.001001 0.001076 
tcp_downloaded_data 0.008375 0.008732 
write_external_storage 0.005832 0.005646 
internet_permission 0.010057 0.012358 
arp_bytes 0.004225 0.003951 
ethernet_bytes 0.010868 0.010567 
smtp_bytes 0.000207 0.000209 
uses_location 0.000237 0.000171 
snort_alert_for_malaware_related_activity 0.000000 0.000000 
cypto_function 0.015592 0.011215 
action_power_connected 0.003530 0.002688 
audio_recording 0.000040 0.000022 
use_of_native_code 0.003228 0.003046 
get_running_task 0.035906 0.030702 
dns_frames 0.005726 0.005673 
access_camera 0.002402 0.002125 
Shared_preference_contain_URL 0.000941 0.001013 
snort_high_severity_alert 0.000000 0.000000 
snort_alert_for_exploit_kit_activity 0.000000 0.000000 
stoped_processes 0.000059 0.000078 
read_phone_state 0.024298 0.024702 
read_history_bookmark 0.005333 0.005165 
crypto_algo_RC4 0.000000 0.000003 
ip_frames 0.007820 0.007470 
arp_frames 0.003449 0.003500 




accessed_so_file 0.020489 0.020991 




crypto_algo_DES 0.013869 0.014671 
udp_bytes 0.008282 0.008403 
action_power_disconnected 0.002597 0.003175 
Device_ID 0.053690 0.055602 
apk_accessed_from_storage 0.038469 0.033273 
user_present 0.002118 0.002894 
write_sms_mms 0.002359 0.001736 
installed_new_application 0.000000 0.000000 
crypto_algo_AES 0.003038 0.003217 
device_admin_enabled 0.000000 0.000000 
dns_bytes 0.008345 0.009235 
irc_bytes 0.000000 0.000000 
control_vibrator 0.002338 0.002246 
tcp_uploaded_data 0.007722 0.007902 
dynamic_code 0.005111 0.006226 
using_camera 0.000000 0.000000 
get_account 0.003942 0.004455 
receive_boot_completed 0.007926 0.008128 
Network_Operator 0.003012 0.003347 
access_fine_location 0.004098 0.003793 
queried_account_info 0.001300 0.001308 
change_wifi_state 0.010473 0.010435 
change_network_state 0.002014 0.002272 
udp_downloaded_data 0.000553 0.000690 
contains_another_apk 0.009256 0.009598 




baidu_silent_install 0.000003 0.000004 
Sim_Operator_Name 0.001029 0.001081 
device_admin_granted 0.000000 0.000000 
write_calendar 0.001628 0.001757 
location_wallpaper_readlogs 0.001451 0.001463 
known_malware_sig_string 0.000000 0.000000 
bookmark 0.003837 0.003963 
jar_accessed_from_storage 0.002845 0.002553 
restart_packages 0.001943 0.001888 
irc_frames 0.000000 0.000000 
camera 0.003308 0.003318 
use_of_SMTP 0.000263 0.000178 
use_of_android_packer 0.020429 0.021273 
ethernet_frames 0.007564 0.008015 
zip_accessed_from_storage 0.001509 0.002002 
write_history_bookmark 0.001260 0.001121 
udp_frames 0.006532 0.005916 
ip_bytes 0.010512 0.011033 
sim_iso_country 0.002002 0.001797 
system_level_alert 0.037465 0.035081 




read_calendar 0.001730 0.002114 
creates_exe 0.000000 0.000000 
boot_completed 0.000027 0.000035 
baidu_detect_root 0.000003 0.000002 
send_sms 0.006520 0.006374 
access_download_manager 0.000360 0.000347 




write_accesspoint_proxy_setting 0.000338 0.000324 
download_without_notification 0.000334 0.000431 
know_adware 0.007757 0.008787 
aborted_broadcast 0.000000 0.000000 
directly_install_application 0.002567 0.002455 
modify_phone_state 0.000778 0.000792 
read_logs 0.004988 0.002659 
access_superuser 0.000055 0.000053 




contains_so 0.003535 0.004523 




package_removed 0.000881 0.000858 
URL_flaged_on_virustotal 0.001156 0.000934 
turn_phone_on_off 0.000708 0.000767 
mount_unmount_filesystem 0.008521 0.006661 
use_of_IRC 0.000152 0.000199 




create_bluetooth_connection 0.000959 0.001011 
cryptography_used 0.012460 0.012507 
IP_address_blacklisted 0.000000 0.000000 
contains_arm_binary 0.000000 0.000000 
MAC_address 0.027863 0.025944 
use_of_reflection_code 0.052308 0.043432 




queried_installed_apps 0.007316 0.005174 
read_external_storage 0.001863 0.001680 
read_contact 0.001625 0.001434 
SMS_received 0.000275 0.000296 
kill_background_process 0.001527 0.002007 
proxy_change 0.005473 0.005407 
execution_of_shell_command 0.001169 0.001084 
hiden_payload 0.002470 0.002244 
intercept_outgoing_call 0.001262 0.001287 
interact_accross_user_full 0.000312 0.000266 
media_changes 0.000391 0.000344 
 
6.9 Efficiency matrix: 
 Following matrix indicate the efficiency of the prediction using created models: 
Score indicates the predication accuracy of specific model, higher the score better is the 
success of guessing correct classification of submitted application.  
Support Vector Machine Model Accuracy Score:  
0.320235756385 
 
Random Forest Classification Model Accuracy Score: 
0.92141453831 
 
Random Forest Regression Accuracy Score: 
0.661604214571 
 
Precision Score:  
 Precision indicates the accuracy from false positive, false negative, true positive 
and true negative score prospective: 
Precision :  
 Precision = True Positive / (True Positive + False Positive)  
 For class malware and class benign respectively: [ 0.92876712, 0.90277778] 
 Average precision: 0.896551724138 
Recall : 
 Recall = True Positive / (True Positive + False Negative) 
 For class malware and class benign respectively: [ 0.96033994, 0.83333333 ] 






6.10 Proposed process for Android signature creations and manual analysis  
 After an application is predicted as malware then analyst can carry out manual 
analysis. Following standard process is defined: 
 Step 1: Pulling malware and source code from AndroSandX repository, download 
binary and network traffic. 
 Step 2: Start debugging in IDA pro 
 Step 3: Use Linux for providing fake services like HTTP server, DNS server, 
Windows for running IDA pro, Android VM for execution of malware.  
 Step 3: Following tools are used Wireshark, IDA pro, Logcat, FakeDNS, 
INetSim, Honeynet. 
 Step 4: Track down the behavioral and network unique identifier by analyzing 
outbound HTTP requests and network traffic. Analyzing Logcat data create system level 
identifiers.  
 Step 5: Utilizing the unique identifiers create a snort signature and Logcat based 
IOCs 







The hypothesis for the research that “It is feasible to predict a sub set of potentially 
malicious Android application using machine learning from a given larger set of 
unclassified Android applications. Such system will need a good sandboxing solution and 
will utilize static and dynamic behavioral data.” The hypothesis for the research is proved 
using a successful experimentation based approach. Research work went through rigors 
experimentation system design and development. The outcome of the research is very 
positive and successful proof of the hypothesis is presented. Large data set results are 
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9 Appendix A 
Test sample set result data: 
Ticket_id :: 13002| Hash :: fc48ce80abdab553399621e94bed7664a79fe51500bdb6e75b1923a8bd854c97 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13004| Hash :: cc460a4ec9ecdebef2f16810f775d508eaaab7ac496db154a5b470b1fe909bc6 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13005| Hash :: 30fe9bea4fd5063ddce7ec6b5632aed113cbfe7903234ade1db06c1eebde3447 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13007| Hash :: bdba03cb55ad08d998b4b00bb5df7b6254ce28b6a0fbfbdc0e7ea20b0a05ec53 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13008| Hash :: 5f0bbd247d78eed18333b83828b2cf6e840480857422ec933ffbaa5db4676004 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13009| Hash :: c9b2e5ee8ef9a9a3c9521286406579f25a985ef8113b54310a07c07055ce683c |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13014| Hash :: 4fdca175d101ef41a94412bf582ed2117d4b939de39a491971db278c8c1b63e8 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13015| Hash :: 1146032aa497a96f6d98106fd36114229d563ca8de6d38d8189c9ea6f57c0e9f |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13018| Hash :: c7e918ccc41b9a244e6d46f8b384744797bb38d15b5f4cbf4bb431b9573e7d86 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13019| Hash :: 136443d3b65200a32f62cd496dab11ff7f84cc9d94c08fb4bce1bcfb421ad275 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13021| Hash :: c6f2ad2b248bf928037a9f8fbd5f38680ce482ad55a954c7fbf2b98a627f8759 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13023| Hash :: 62c41f31ec7473cb2dd6310e68636c7f673ad6118093318bd45ea7289294bed8 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13024| Hash :: c21537da1fef6702bbf61b51d8b5bc2cfe223b58926b1d2ef426a6172296ae57 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13026| Hash :: c9eb4f7267409ca252296aabf04e0ecdf03f2beb7ceee2801ddc6546e295b6bc |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13027| Hash :: 087201acfeb561b8cb4e14c7ec6ae847c962aba45e44f15b567ed43c1fdb2af1 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13028| Hash :: ca5632a3a313875af76761843e72ab744888c0d1c4ae91f88ef1b854567bfd8d |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13031| Hash :: 64f2a03f57d33341833aec900d3c2b258acdc47edda177a9b82be66429b97d5a |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13032| Hash :: b9b7961e4fa943795eeae65173493f9b62eff26394ab1d76f24f5706da821857 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13033| Hash :: ccb910c869dd5f595d8aabfd2b44ed0f9788d6797a13af97d9d0f83ecbe9eff6 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13034| Hash :: 22df0b592f8cecee2f3690c11403bd9304d961882e0fcdbda3ec2ee69451987b |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13035| Hash :: 014065f379f1d47dd920ab331113aa90b2068d123f5b47cd8c89eac61bc47b62 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13038| Hash :: ccc3c7fbdf3a215a5e12dbd380becdae0af77714ca229396213ee0faf5311e54 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13039| Hash :: c77b0da14f75481c1602182d5348baca3392c50d22d9b14bdb491926b61c0abf |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13043| Hash :: 59cc054fd154285d476c5c71d21e9d6a69d5021a52602ec55a627d470e9c2039 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13044| Hash :: c71464d1f12f269c8e733bb0e8d4fe937e2015c09b8eebd8d9584cd262f7a228 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13045| Hash :: ca00da13f4dd9d20898bee4a0735276216d89a6d4a7eef80bc380a97fe24ae3c |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13046| Hash :: cada149e1ba36ba36ea953614a0233dd9f5ab6cae1b013a98bb4dbec7ba01c64 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13047| Hash :: c1becfd90472e2e710d76211ff5d5892a84f7c3bcb716b70fa72da4de55eb6d3 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13049| Hash :: 45aea60cb22dbc48e6c5f338a9dc779d733b58aa451ada15f84092a68b9f4a71 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13051| Hash :: 9e1230c5780594791cc6af3ac23514ea38c0064919df5b69b1a56faa9a6e5649 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13052| Hash :: d1d5f55b964a4551ddf527c3fc8ace305ddf9e47e1f480dc5171b3599eb90604 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13054| Hash :: cae4f1bf028421e6202ff0dbd3fcfe33cfac0acd0f36bfa37c79403da735a9bb |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13056| Hash :: 26d75f292e3a7bf62d9aa3a05042cb73beb2482701e1ff7cc7e7482df88fdfde |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13058| Hash :: c792f4d7c40757eaa3ae7b7334ca5aa982a017aa3875d29894957e5bfc674de6 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13060| Hash :: c6dbdc6fd198becb4953d208b225f1618b38cdf11a2f7369bd6c769ded8cac18 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13061| Hash :: be405bc7a704c6d0dffeb72e88d45d1eff5b8987c58634e53bfd96e8dbc5f9e7 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13062| Hash :: 1994140eab07181629e1090159e64c4d3324240d6a1677a2342e31731db91ce5 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13063| Hash :: d0a894a44435256e87401d7dc7fde4df58169fd81d49dc14a7ba3124f7ca2ac8 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13065| Hash :: 96cad65f77ae26eba046a9e7b148e8c88eedaf1ca29d2b753ea81828f5e6bca3 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13066| Hash :: 06ffd3880789ac1d08141e2823e95c0ee7d99e7488fda7a08ac18dc078d5238a |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13067| Hash :: 792ac2de4a2dd544a2176d2261b21be46b9935583eddb0e333d001d276635f8a |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13070| Hash :: 0834a50f1e53872c3140a4a9da472603dbc0032aa74e8ac4c20ca7fb91effb3e |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13071| Hash :: cae0679d56432eca2751c69c8cdaa611a66e35b1763d49881befd86c3bcf1708 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13072| Hash :: 06e0215ae28ed983631e9519a8482f01cf82b7c67b763200effafaeb24a290b1 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13073| Hash :: 5aa19d58ccda518979ecec97db9ee7a6a1de606fd661ef9238e65f3b533f170c |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13074| Hash :: c7d7487314bdf86739bf8bf5118448d8fa24560619b0ce22ac5e9ec1124a3e8b |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13075| Hash :: c82f19b816a235f8e3a8e4995d3c1bbe507f4f0162aaee511e8d4ec04dd94b5b |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13078| Hash :: c8b39c924bda8a1f48deb188c75eab06ba351b8542f5d859c0e1e27c51928884 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13079| Hash :: 90aa80c19b1f57d64384542ae0ee67db24d5335acff7c461548cd98e859411c9 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13082| Hash :: cc4f2a2fd87b1d556ad4d755372d403271577d0a4608230ec93279b3e2a63adb |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13083| Hash :: c935c5d20668633f879f44179e837aa2c3e16436349a87a0e3f0b05a229ae159 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13086| Hash :: 8f584dcdaba3eba690de8f22b6b9641f2ebe129cbed661e1f20e0a22e5a9ad09 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13088| Hash :: c72d80077c28c3b5479c6f017a4f45e9827bc45dfb2c15f18add58335b7d99cc |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13089| Hash :: 68abdebf27be552c6eedbc12ab0053c2bcd26e77fc1671d0f03e27f133984ae7 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13092| Hash :: f870666aae1019ad7d6375d2f2a30e5a892f148cdc293714258a9df5ba524cea |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13096| Hash :: 31e616facba512e5736a5f92e3b4b399b34a22658cebf99cfdaf7f2a2d7f1b32 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13097| Hash :: 5fb1033c8515f1409511f6556782c942d33654a8cfbdd84382c86b27202f6241 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13099| Hash :: 30aa5bfe84acd4a4170db016dc7a8f00e730cb9d7fe3a0ca483a45c621c3986c |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13102| Hash :: 9fc23a4e6686c8295af7147ec494f37bb1570c0c78452bb652332f97a36b3bb9 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13103| Hash :: c9a1e589b60d795e277c8812671a668821047775f85c8f10ceed0d8d593271b4 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13105| Hash :: c7360df49501334ff8b04339790e6db39eaae72c98e4dc4b0a7ef793e6d594d0 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13106| Hash :: 30ae05d32b757f1af3f28069c9e6c5fc9efa537e62ff6a0857ab6e030d92b8ef |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13107| Hash :: a5aa466f34193493238a1b1c04dbd8e38b3bdedc4e9c3a7b083ce73591f92df9 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13109| Hash :: 0fba16cbc915b65e0c6aca71c628fdd79a85aab762b57a618a78a2dacd6286c8 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13112| Hash :: c84093271930996382156ccef3136f109c6a8f2ae3d60087829acabfeadcadf6 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13117| Hash :: 018547257cf26cda09c4c940d9d1601ea9a47da9d8101aeed97f2bfa13308f07 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13119| Hash :: d2ce94c20a8aabb4d39a1fd3647813f7331d44d4b0beb34c832a4617126d3973 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13120| Hash :: d62d58304917ca8ddb25dbc76b34c837b70bdc0ae75304c54f823770335224b6 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13124| Hash :: edf606c17e34185253943b1de949b5e4bfa5047aff3e46017d5d603b592da863 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13128| Hash :: 2e2aa59e1f209ef57e27a2e296c87d31e9b4118be516a6cca48cac07a54f5097 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13131| Hash :: cace2ffc4707dd5a2c309e7393b9d825455602c1992ffddec4c4cb93a2447cf7 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13135| Hash :: 6093d381dbc71e81e97ce1b828ea78ce2602ebfc3cf91bd9ce57a50e8620b22c |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13136| Hash :: ca81453c4caed849bebac2fce3cf54a774c0105656062c3919f6fa0abc4814ba |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13138| Hash :: c90a5fc02c1bdcddd2c314ded91b1edc080aeda38a5bcf4e3c2894e31825979f |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13139| Hash :: c740955d375451e433a5e0ce64b44c8ebbdb4c6965468e47bfc26778bd1230a2 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 




Ticket_id :: 13142| Hash :: 87bf02dc36ed4f2bd0c5000abff9ba73c0a32d47edd31cecce0dfdccc6832c5b |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13143| Hash :: 8b95cef2685389ff015201a9a1efa6864635c0aa9f13c371cd8713ceca710023 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13144| Hash :: 6434448b875d9fc3be0f58c3ebd3cc5413227028bc898c679bd55fd9fea160a1 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13145| Hash :: 0dc8ce5c31f45ba232af475e4e952eee67f904cfd9cd57996af9a9285cb8c1a8 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13148| Hash :: 9529df20bbfa8cedd19e4d918b1c4ae12410ef73c149ff3b5b0cafaee5e56e0f |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13149| Hash :: ca51f2d36818415b116bc041911852a11bb12fdb5fb90ee861adf78260572ac2 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13150| Hash :: ed890e654f184b3313531c7810331eee0fa4a28e5e5daa14f35abe187692affe |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13154| Hash :: 7b8375f375fbb62ffecb80decd8072f7090e5c524a8b8e0d5617c048ad37fb81 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13156| Hash :: c75e560162fe07dae762c5673cd578b9ffb9ab6991b47c6592d3df0390785fd9 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13158| Hash :: 1e5e2d0ed69ec2a2e23c83ddc33a77b28b0b28464c988877907bdfc28f7af7c2 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13159| Hash :: 85a93e1155430ecebf16c68ee8e5f32ec7ed72441691e3117a641ab217e20ba6 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13160| Hash :: c98fb3012c5156e66768113f425b2adb499419ad7289a9a378edf6065b663028 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13165| Hash :: 9d3f984f1e43fd955dfe0c04592998dfbee6b3ea4ab4d1b42f94815150abe062 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13166| Hash :: 6203cc2b175c1bd9a8a809c7cfe6af9b6554e9f0629ccf5195557575892925bc |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13171| Hash :: e6d228a381fbb5c944db4e4af145cafbb436d5705ede883b41e606dc469f74a9 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13172| Hash :: c26b1db4ec74863aedad22616b555e35c25174b57f60efdba23b13d1af064330 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13173| Hash :: c8319035a211236d5b94f91853a3424cb4079044b4af8559272535c6b72e549f |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13174| Hash :: c9d84e273f9775ad5f7bd5cf6ddcc9bba36890ef7cd64b392e20560e3ff004f4 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13175| Hash :: a498182d3b2c0dd02cc051e67e90c2f2a8869a94df00c610655abde03fabd128 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13177| Hash :: c97afcfeea73327f86109b76fb444253489f67709a399e9cf8301fd35d831ff1 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13179| Hash :: ca79ca1ac41b7dcbb045219f1b57f1cb5db20aca57cf9a468a8e0faae7bfb10e |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13181| Hash :: 6e625a18a84826c1e77cefea728bc21bffb2a0db0ed4bb33c66f58be1c499aa2 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13182| Hash :: c9acc2c6ec44f6ff555eb0369cfbd33d1cd7205d230d142072caf4bf1b3c08f7 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13185| Hash :: c949f8755eac881ae3b3636f7b64b943efad6a8e0bf72add74db1e9b991a149c |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13187| Hash :: c79f478c4653d1f7d875030d3498ee31fdb8ada6986d762f761407b218070d5b |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13188| Hash :: c097bb9d830f2ecf1148737acdfb7577335e0adb0d0d8977be1f03b0605fbba9 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13190| Hash :: c97df17fcff00ea4bbf201ca3fcbe1f7348c740e9255befc64f6fef5ecd751fb |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13191| Hash :: a75ee0b0a3e7218c8a947e7d4eaa8a67477b6cc569a13b99224cc4f1d741e9c3 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13194| Hash :: 16250445cbac3c527499670ec83e9cf9964335ddec5a46d6e4739a444ad77f2b |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13196| Hash :: 9e187be9efa0bc84ffe73ac96c8051296ac9df09cc64180a4f73067445cf50bc |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13199| Hash :: 66c2e8026dcbb24e2083583166bff5e95deed4b1a4931c585401c6a0516ff880 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13201| Hash :: d6cd2931aca245bede61b12c28bcc625ce7ae4aec29c2a4eda0fc6ed415edd10 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13203| Hash :: c7ea852ca302029c0f835de9943ddb111da9e67087dccbd7e154d916e676ce63 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13204| Hash :: f4e065113646552841259bc98219b2fa4ddd26af734264537bfd97d3504c495e |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13209| Hash :: 36334bf29f3670487fe767c41d5ea49d1c249190a56253a6115c96b1f7b29954 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13213| Hash :: 12f57f478f1d29b25c4709140ddd1b024467146d5ee72984fc38f16ac2265c43 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13214| Hash :: 26b111b01485fe4ebdfabf1e7d5ad3f28f38542942ca1123f5d1211aa56d7457 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13215| Hash :: c7ae98089be4d64845ae114d481f4649fde391f4d6249e3d5b5f01fcf3d2414f |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13216| Hash :: 369905cac0a7e802ef897939caa326b14acf4bee6ac5409fe74a0398bcef7c9d |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13218| Hash :: c973787cc74d01aad38e986c840dcee00524b26fa011c0643bb975f1792be521 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13219| Hash :: c8cf6cb557ffda56ae785b04493cd9f0a6f3fa8cf50b2c1544a871bdff6cba3a |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13220| Hash :: 60fc5ba70b3d637e197d6ca242c7ee24cdd195f93096f3930acfb73aff92177a |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13221| Hash :: 552f3777ad038306b0735dad8126f78c1e4405b3692c41a14bde84ddd911b749 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13222| Hash :: c9e8f3d4065baa89592ceb8085a0ac96b743761502dae079b85ce71bba9644ff |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13225| Hash :: 3a6b6679eea8596b0b7c9eb1a6253e492cc8cf38201de5f2ecea83fec1e51f7e |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13226| Hash :: d1d32a3728ce418fe96cbc86ec4948660aec847643a045e9191998dba281050d |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13229| Hash :: 98633eddd37c3bd9877531491c5ab996e0bf041c3cb7db5ab1036ac2359b92c3 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13230| Hash :: ca71d010b0522e73b24807f0c98a3047e43731dc826230dd09452c212d7dbf17 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13232| Hash :: cc5c6ded37561a5e0e5d94d2df07b354a5d77f4a6479cf11a47cb88ea25fee23 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13233| Hash :: 2f5e3e7b1d5c40e9ff7030305e22b6aa2ab0174ea074c9c2f217ee828620b28a |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13234| Hash :: 7aff63e11abe2f1dae60225bdcbfc038eccf8eebee89c3841f2bb6ac1316c932 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13235| Hash :: ca3af7542eb7984c470a6ca40512c515174082ab945190864161864a951b5c17 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13236| Hash :: dd75e6e22a5f2176c1a26bee3e9df821493cc35180ce3351d56186dbc690efe6 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13237| Hash :: cc11db192acac72e1f927201d34c744c98dc947dd2d01d365898f8475a322eef |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13238| Hash :: 224282288637b643dcfec31f925d18b6f66bc28f47a40011dc3b3af36a78355a |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13241| Hash :: c6fd9094571712d4c581f89a7b137214a9467238a6f7aac5ac2d0f21fd4a605a |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13242| Hash :: 0c95345ffb2eb5251757812db8143dab4424bc95bf0b46584571e693c9413388 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13244| Hash :: 5b64a800ae2adbdb8f88872e18d45ea0d719e4f006c338ef41cfbabbc855686b |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13246| Hash :: b9fb60b50ae68335639d9cb270e57a716efb3cac7ae81e506144227321db71e7 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13248| Hash :: 706f86f614ad5e2c909ec49f16a7d5519958e30030124964b5921d2924c5452d |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13252| Hash :: da81636c1b187e013b3b8a61bc8ab7e1bfa2aa45aebb79ee943208a91bc0d5d9 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13255| Hash :: ca6b95002d280ea78b777108376745beb4d2124dc7a838cf87be169e56a2b7cb |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13256| Hash :: 1a6f4502ed7e14ef98842c7c4ee65476ef42d191fd10ea265c201698e9a52253 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13257| Hash :: cbb64c5bbaea0a8051bdaf4070a641bf0888c6d4d159031305e103f1e63fc8ea |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13259| Hash :: c853560050bdf0b2b303bdb4e7589d81511365b06dccfcd1b53b6c771d260b76 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13262| Hash :: 3543f4efdb4e64705c1e694ac2ee4ac3c31f8709afb7ba8b283bd6a438150088 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13266| Hash :: 020b575d0f24652642b3456b0d5b4044ffe172316fd8b84508bcb22367b22b7a |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13271| Hash :: cb5aa3575998bd7ae2377e8c8e8085d06f89dd4bb9f0ade2d55666322edc751a |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13274| Hash :: c8a50400e482881b985fd1776a5edd1bbd5290111ef9535139ad67b3f583502e |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13275| Hash :: b941cb6156793decf657f3fd01d81934b0a37535889e2bb4ad6bd3e78c181a0a |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13277| Hash :: 109f056a2694064f96d1eb9aa7a3f10ec941a5b147a115cabc604b6de1a8c86c |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13278| Hash :: 137832555be7b905cf31cedd4cbf0bf011dbf5067d79164d0ccdcc7feb8f249a |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13279| Hash :: c71306c144c27c616cd925f19fb118ecb5016c324e9bb324a218fc39d2dff7ca |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13280| Hash :: e1366693b703d2e057a9e81b10bdd00642c4cdbec397e3f0b55224d1fa3f5025 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13281| Hash :: 380061bd4833624e069904945009e5fec314319aa4e2e94617034663a1a81ad1 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13282| Hash :: 4e3e8c4d3bce8c16ece4a4bce3d3379e5db62c92541281677c5296d973a8f984 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13284| Hash :: 6f264d59ada8e8f1e1f46771b832e8f1940f4924d81fecfac4d8379ce747c2f6 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13289| Hash :: 7316db3cc57eea213bdb7c0fa950bbe06344f819349e26da47b82d5cea3255e9 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 
Ticket_id :: 13293| Hash :: f70e3a9ce797669b59ddbeb778c5df96f26b8b952c2f2d39ae1f38cf4e3191f7 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 1 




Ticket_id :: 13303| Hash :: 3e90e36cf760c6d3606d9d979d1c897456021fde43fe2047f10ee95907417295 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13305| Hash :: 1774931ec9adc817db0a7d95795ab9a8971582d722738ceeb2c898056159ee4f |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13307| Hash :: 1692de232380168d92a9f8310bd99d933e90832e4bf5c90070f941fdaf984819 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13310| Hash :: 7e02833138d08ec013b1aed86dddf5dc9f05c6185d565093c432f5eb6661dfe7 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13311| Hash :: 8e30460dbb769e36fc0560b302b9976c950fc6dfdb7a029c53a20d6abbab9045 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13314| Hash :: 28e4c80ac5df696c5cb1d86d98a63c4a3ede6b0f823930e340ff1d7b108134d3 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13315| Hash :: dcc9b37b7308b2b1ec79ad54ec39129baa8d4b8a99bc0f5ee08097efd3b544d2 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13317| Hash :: 1f213eb36b7608ee3e77d71d4e355c7ae1bf62d38cab3e0c7b728632adc2f40d |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13320| Hash :: 1cc163bdd317319bdf985cfca4ec23b988e7480d340a6dc9dd33b28bf215a917 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13327| Hash :: 4765d1bb39698dfc47f7ab6e0fc3a4afe7b8505239ff2ced067b9585c6a2484c |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13328| Hash :: 1cd86c9e0454ba01ce49660f6060a6172e6532dff595d68e5ccd7b8f72881511 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13329| Hash :: 6280cadd5cb7a432679bbd976a89f3b6e4b9c88ee22cf6fd8a2747bd5428310d |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13331| Hash :: 598b4a635b92eb4bbcb6754481128737cf2cff3750b878bacf73c81f0a4dc0d4 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13333| Hash :: 9ff66304c096d9a44df748f4d3f53f953ab3dbe48fd0c80ad40b7e0c6608afa8 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13334| Hash :: 9996bcd2c918baf3f39c8a8513371ebb0bfc844ba1d93428d8fbbe47021a1bbd |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13337| Hash :: 5cf639f6bc24b2808026cfd5ea18f4e749151b543f59a1de86d28ae549104dfe |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13339| Hash :: 18db6c5b2ec3c1e37617ab1387b28f7899724b05efd9b10c89af8aeda1601996 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13340| Hash :: ffac33007622b422c34076cc255873fb19700d3508b257b40f9ca64fbf8409c8 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13343| Hash :: f137b1b147e30f9c92cda4532cd34a1a3e64c4d09ccc4993d5101eb1b3e55088 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13345| Hash :: d52763666ac1ce2b9b1202a7dea5b1a26379a582b7068818dd7fa8f48a6f0062 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13346| Hash :: f9674d0be6947df86b256cc994760e989b9391bff66f7430a3601516d8f95530 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13349| Hash :: a83669c22406607a25366ca62e5e715751945919d09307fc912b7e6f7369ca20 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13350| Hash :: 49a8d7b301c0ec3bc78ed003efb88035b4eed9e28d154f349d56a48c3492670b |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13351| Hash :: 3fbb4e88f46bd149590e9355cf6859538280e66bdf1d9996ba953a2a3b513057 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13352| Hash :: e2010d58cee00a897b25a1e47692ef64a01673e4265e2daa7755a897c5eb4d07 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13353| Hash :: c278722887fdf29ea7c2b4b82f85fddf1eb2a2bac96d635a22a35f4a08f94e25 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13354| Hash :: b8936612542053331f2521d66bfe0873a1fe7539de50291228d34b230d271007 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13356| Hash :: 7c4dc490af0c84ade3035bcae5e589b8f4851e158b8d42c3a94e91e31fb4b093 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13358| Hash :: 07ed0c1a916990970e37b75f1d3383144e30be47dc2339de2ec4f8d98305660b |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13359| Hash :: ec6a7b7f46e46e98e1f4b274f02bf7d8276252f40c714cb85f59e28ad7492041 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13361| Hash :: c4162a466804f179cff7cc57edda372831ccdadd0131bbd84de10e1755cd89ef |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13362| Hash :: 9b3a4c1cf4f55ebbfa0fc8a42ce1399dba549cf4e804fc173c7a48d50e9abdff |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13363| Hash :: 31fcbae7b7e516b4726775d45214681b11eb16ef39123a01ea0d119ec8dc843b |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13366| Hash :: 5b50501455d63ecb1133f88c5f614722851c09d1e67840543e55463c397d1159 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13369| Hash :: 9b90337df07789241184b4d9ea2143a403b6a39f12b3c3cb2875de2007741499 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13371| Hash :: 3bd76e569b80e6132c54973f3a4c5b1911cb651e443e845e2fa4d2713da00ad9 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13373| Hash :: db6fa33469900dd903d08c4a516bb2149520bc406f1bcb02a2afd61c804e1475 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13377| Hash :: 85d43cd6ea4047d9ccf4a83784dfbba4428790e0c7307c8d58ed5bb416952d36 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13378| Hash :: 139c1080c124c783dc2923cf296c050317560c120b65cd06e68fbd891dd2c2f4 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13380| Hash :: 3f23cfb03a5bb944a14758ed7c89a532b94c8de1e40eea6f43b7eb83343efa49 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13382| Hash :: db233d04b82794d317e47614eb42637535c9f14016d5784dfb6b9a9b39972049 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13384| Hash :: df49cd718b79771f8ec139ab3ffafa85811785bc17af2a93ecc98b8c36e2e0c7 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13385| Hash :: db4e5155f5a988f55c366fcf04a4a3309756df1c2cc8cf027e8a7229d605b19f |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13388| Hash :: 10d24393c519fa1db39230153b1ed12e80e4b7df56e6f59c8c864a522ebf8e89 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13394| Hash :: 04a559eab215934f09a78b37d8954c4f1ebc98ad27c2c51a06902bea52623d78 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13395| Hash :: 794f0f5bf8172476dfd89f44c63a7e30e90c27ecc7da64792148d3b6b9dd554e |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13397| Hash :: f03dca56e69ea7eeac7a85aa65456b86a8030e932f2d89aa99acf333897f321d |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13398| Hash :: 7abbfe0c8303e2beb9baafad682d844d3fc71a15ab35de03e3fa6076cd37c125 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13399| Hash :: f047393ef31b2040973f6c8816c97910fc2f359d71b4cf59acd345f2c6efaa7c |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13400| Hash :: 5331546f614e7e79973761440f1458e8f9fdc7e0ae81ef7e7148b83104739f61 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13402| Hash :: ec01d0aa5ee96d889fd7acf39ca2f7858f5d50898ba085ca6b8b526f3206e4fc |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13403| Hash :: e57320eb1cd909afd30a699b39d7ceafd3149e08703f44d8d097e9230c2bbc48 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13405| Hash :: e08d736c0776034736f4060cb572b86dc4af1b70ac7d037d13acbb315683c707 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13407| Hash :: 0dd33fe1cfda2118c28762603d6d0e99caa7aa001213412746a494ca84494002 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13410| Hash :: 9934024b3d65ed96c1b99a2fe08097743f1d497b9e16df9e774009ea29fa3502 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13411| Hash :: 941bd3a0aad0a831fea7a6695d9400d636580630581650670ce2ef541fdf42ba |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13412| Hash :: 75ad9ed35ec009be4d2b7f51ca2e7a71ef9343b2cc4c11d375ebbbaa17450e50 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13413| Hash :: 8da06740051127c07c23f3a9cdcfd5f37532cebcb00751e298fddada3a49a06d |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13414| Hash :: 10595d3c07784dd4bf1715e5a64eb9a2ccf870a02e829e8dfda6c96b920f3ba4 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13416| Hash :: 58e47d014f305d525c7ee5c652b2c651e1b288001f9895fd4f0bbe1d3e1d8dd7 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13417| Hash :: eac001128df0a90afcad94deaab50e9ed49f2644b57fe6db7644c4f3ca189ca0 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13418| Hash :: 88025b9308dc73f6b97cdbb5303974da1accc7361ba0c5b09696e32672099cca |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13419| Hash :: d5606d95a0e4997facec5f4ce95bc477678c61040d92a30ab1df5a286af869e3 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13420| Hash :: 198d1ea284e0d52654e8a8f9fe89220cf7677f4a720e39c1afc6a26f3819ebde |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13421| Hash :: f281c59f7fe8c2c06a2df40ea0af91eff9f4e5a4c6012c525a29adc55fb60550 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13422| Hash :: cc2fd258f96f207e52c01a12939c2899d360078d85b51f1852ea455080d7a54c |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13424| Hash :: f59a6f30a207492932480712b5b6b6863e58e51563cd13be22a23a21c707fdd0 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13425| Hash :: b02cbb5076775ef548ed9a16236a5c213250d29bce3d11040a33ffff148e932f |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13427| Hash :: 49e2ec4fd15e48ebcd51f55ccc62aa77e506f921732d6b8897a937da89bc9df5 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13428| Hash :: d76653ea29ce1352c09acc6c7ca9a7a76cc98b77e6f3e56a0df533b80400b667 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13429| Hash :: b0c64369d6a3a56a3a3c569c85c2e2956d84f9244b27efa38ca43406fe27452f |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13430| Hash :: b6a3a2207270684216b4543303152640d00703017f37058ef1517c8c3a55bf59 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13431| Hash :: 02dc10b0faf551d6509a935f8c848b7313069909a8809c69ee93d31280741291 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13432| Hash :: 2bdba370438f01f00f135695a40c531c104a59cf74d29dc97c7ad26e67394ec8 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13433| Hash :: fbec8c65e1d413f1cedb4a14ab9ea581c129951cfb2e10d1b5191d8fda57f3c9 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13434| Hash :: 1ad574ffb9da4cd1358056f25e1ad2a48668401901a59d28d690b1cb4603516f |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13435| Hash :: e739f887c8a539f9296444b24e0fa573073b74f8411b04c92e48d9580dca408a |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13437| Hash :: 6c4ad806d7109e1db3444a1c1b2f13bd34ee2d29ad510dbe2ed2f556561c3959 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13438| Hash :: 9df6180ab60cb173d534dd486726eb4be16572f8dd9d52bcfcfb3478f4dbeba3 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 




Ticket_id :: 13442| Hash :: 4d460987be628355c7ed196ec6675a85a494c414fa4fecf34b156836ff92de33 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13445| Hash :: ab250a1cc1592fd9cef8832fbceda473ae57d46d0489d3b44d3f088088c194a2 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13446| Hash :: 1a0206a0420990e12243b60b145bc5790beae5539dd362da25f6c563bbc43223 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13449| Hash :: 4fd30683cdd38ffac52fcf505e1b181a5b8b5cd4802bc87853d62c1e8729424f |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13454| Hash :: d8511ad51351e9018c9a6a1bb596026ee8589cb6ae35439110f5263e7b37d7da |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13456| Hash :: 809c98a9e3f2e47f494e16e7da0c246915c783eca7f84ba4ec6c1b775f857c4c |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13458| Hash :: d1ab8d531d66e19e581d80209abeaf8b0021870ebb46a4462e27c65c4e1593ec |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13459| Hash :: 48e453a570971ffad871ae7295403dab469f244612775fc63740ac7f05d14105 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13461| Hash :: 788621173fd4ff65865105ef9f4a96fe30aa747d143177e3e87d951068bff6e9 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13464| Hash :: a5f5cefe60eaf4b93229a790e18b6879f7a1cf903b915174f6994bd0bdf608a4 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13468| Hash :: 7d66a6831ffcbc8fa43704ecf99ab52d5879e6fdbf44078f3fc53b1504034882 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13469| Hash :: 80e20f03b77fd66b4245918b601902c17de3c4c6ee7d4447d96107996e7f50a2 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13474| Hash :: 2d780f57a5d47e72e23ae2677878af782f9e53cd266fea624355e2ca8329ffc0 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13479| Hash :: f5e0ece6c05214d5331c104bf0cff2fbb2557a9543a6de847d70521ab36bf735 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13480| Hash :: 71f94de4976fd88b59d9fe0ea626be65c801ae9b566de7ea5dae189672f2b4a7 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13481| Hash :: e5747006810e8db4f0b9fb4d97d7c1bc6ab0e1f33eaef7fbadd7a2b2843f2aec |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13482| Hash :: c6fa1f9f010dcee33ba0380b820f8728131209a92a5cc85d6c5164614cbfd361 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13483| Hash :: 10426b3c114a79228bc50fda5e93eecc6fb31df3f4c991014e5e19a352b39d37 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13484| Hash :: eb02c596e511f868c71a6192203acfd39b7ab888424f750eca73b8b15b8befb8 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13487| Hash :: 1a30be8757e616d02fe65110a672c1601889171d4a05beb363f4627d199e274d |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13488| Hash :: 2eaf89f1f65cb721094a82b27958ed937a550a8ca107fc124f69812de89b4691 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13489| Hash :: 5871bb5556662321c4ac8a6f9e28e3a5c3e711c49560b424f3c0e257ada02c05 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13490| Hash :: d266a4da9fae54c7139e50cf7da38695e38dbd52f3ecd156a13d1e498efd8db3 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13491| Hash :: 18f652f39b756050baeda608f1dabb777aa57d1af3295c63144fa44d77bd94c5 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13492| Hash :: 7088fa6e83eaa8faa24569782c51c3e5617a06f89abc359ebd54357bb3ec7d5d |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13493| Hash :: f777ab0ed79dd4d8f0de96d7583cd976e9e79d7dbef7a8fdf3e6d449b9fc69b2 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13494| Hash :: cd5a412c2876373afc3f028a53835b41b463c7921bbd03f167488f29812b3fcb |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13495| Hash :: 81e002a3a649bd429d95522d3fe7e76eab4f05722cf9a2a0c2ca9f636313d836 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13496| Hash :: 8ecbff9bf6cba775246073240fc508bc8961823ca9e8daf1b6255a7d48a509b0 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13497| Hash :: 67400a05a38a5c08cff3532a3e2a26b07f29901d3c096261e8568cb236e53f82 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13498| Hash :: 034c5978611086e6a8617efca1dc0be36a23b4e6f54dd74477e1167ccf602fbf |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13499| Hash :: ecf85cbc9411b27abb9446e2cb3c72451d5a5efdb9a0241336c7f247361f62d8 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13505| Hash :: 29956c45c241498f7fe51b641aa591bb86a46382befd2bbbdb609c9f012cccf1 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13506| Hash :: 7f95651d744c2325acaec98a1fc4e576a24f1c81692348c91d29bc697544b4c6 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13509| Hash :: e45629086f95e68cba7126c20d3a9b23b080069f44738813e7c8e726253ba8b9 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13512| Hash :: 01038be502403caea433de605be701d16f1cc6849d03d6d2f1de9fee565370fd |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13513| Hash :: edc5699402a5653175d5bb490b65ae29edf95f5bbe83217df3f7ceab7fd82c97 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13514| Hash :: f33d71345b9cabf6c690486207e01883dff87e13ff5e86d38f86b6501e82ed7c |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13515| Hash :: c3d49ac4f5d72dcb8a378eeb016ebf45cc09ac17a57378b628b5e442146eee5a |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13516| Hash :: 997343bb42b9e6085122ec9cc7de6239ecc605e2e51d3cf4b9d02e12bdec03f7 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13519| Hash :: e310d996d3a930bd8755103e04dcbe886fd51deefd1366a4e3d35b2b143876f9 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13523| Hash :: 88c32523b7f08ed7dc49b681eb95840ddf8ae28fddb852d898cdd4218fc45873 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13524| Hash :: 733d749f443a794c2a4ec4d6ade577f13e9f225cf8af551f23f52f8e1b73588f |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13527| Hash :: 7b53fd1c0aa21c6c4461d0df0cd545eb8f7c9b1949d23c22ce1fd21976ff5f66 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13531| Hash :: 16b034dc4bfd187cff4c4bfc7444b972bbfbd6c829c13f68e1d0536f640e8f0c |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13533| Hash :: 2ce12517ca791251dee6dbb8b36e1ddba6672c69fc4d4111b21891fef7b9f80e |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13534| Hash :: 347b2956eb551abebba75fd806b9bcbd5c5f8d39f94e6276f0c2abaebcff8f32 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13535| Hash :: 902e0c037e0ddd29ec7d2317c877639c37cb09108958b27abcc91c2986cbbe65 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13537| Hash :: 7291722522b1a63a8c3d2745259e59f2b87c142b9d48102b3bbfc26ec11e7a54 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13538| Hash :: 30c5a445a27f8d08d4eea94121309fea229b09ab7032d467a58e6908cc74d5af |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13539| Hash :: 3dab26a55881ffc84e6bda49cf1c8e0818c227f6ef6d589ca997c678c998144f |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13540| Hash :: e5afaec49152579d9fdd154ec1e98b47a0064a0036013a391e37fcd179551b62 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13541| Hash :: bf9ca9ab2dc713d1c7b6e4b6014808f5d01100d99d9088c263e97c1d2d599dd8 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13542| Hash :: 27afc538c1a5e4e2b294ad641c654292a1e28e2795f44eb2aec599217258039e |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13543| Hash :: e9cc53c5ec31cfd663f22f8b62e54008918f38d5e2df80823a00f988df1a7209 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13544| Hash :: 968e719a9fe362f2b71674a597fdd41f4cee486e27ae93ec4b587b0fbf8eac8d |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13545| Hash :: ed640f1dcfe29a74babc2ea02580245979aa42d83c0b40d8845d23f761a6a263 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13547| Hash :: fc1109bdd7a12375fce284dc04ff8884d622dc22aa068747c029f8a0e0862710 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13548| Hash :: cb92574905df48a723f3884de253fd41fcc95a9af85d84b31c1b2b24fbfb568f |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13549| Hash :: 1eb57711bcf5afeb9df91bc144de9021295837206c279ec529a3b040edaee647 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13550| Hash :: ab8e8599abec6d7693688a34ddac82f9257a67086ef316ffa92f7e094ea0bda5 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13551| Hash :: 9ec1ab2bbafe032f55a5cb996648d3e22f2f1cf9d29ec1a564dee9e4ccf841ef |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13552| Hash :: 92a92c162cc00246f0c2dee41729ca25a2e22cbaf53949de922cb5374ccd0d13 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13553| Hash :: ea5369c83e7bdf0dca000b462f0380703f4ce4e16f97c80e907c011c36c4f848 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13554| Hash :: 73ab4f53d008952d1fb95a64333c107034878bc39b32c87ea0f8ebf62e320aa6 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13556| Hash :: db9928d576a198b580dc3bc0bd9515e4978ebb7b0da72f4525cfd6aa5dd0b622 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13558| Hash :: b2c78b7c050e0fe2dd6bd2cd7788b641b3862ad13b58d73daaca730625875f5e |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13560| Hash :: 06fb8ecb5239593f31eb34011cb10020e07d0adacb9721e8a6d455284c718183 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13561| Hash :: 6c9a18e8b18ec17718945ceb731f19a1b18dded8e89a66b2d965ada743bc1432 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13562| Hash :: b82a93900b3338faadd490aef5d8878b4cdff88ce860866d64935e28a50bc16f |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13564| Hash :: 1cbfbae9be7f1858a115e3d0e67217387b6ffc5077f0000ddc94aa8ed73301d5 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13566| Hash :: 3cf7cb9c158c2e19efb2e463698ac41fef86babaf11fbed28afc24f289e9d882 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13567| Hash :: 4a0bd1efdb5e96624ddf9c5fc92efad89fdf9085b62b7cb465f87c5db4016cdb |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13568| Hash :: 36474406eb8c5b2a4db731e75d6b7cd1d817b8e931b236ac73943a38a2a69d70 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13570| Hash :: aa7a6b030c3e0f17f0bc08108e5059eed440cce31ef7871e0a9cbdeeebf46d2d |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13572| Hash :: 1cc82fd68ddcbda1db91c6378c3c9b8df63244239fb4b16640b2b6fb83270188 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13573| Hash :: 780f364a7deed4caa4adb27f9646f04e4ff390c147661adf1043bc4a68359ff4 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13574| Hash :: d480ef688c4955ace53c412c220fc2a3485e028a17a26785ca96d1d2a0f9a47b |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13575| Hash :: 450b756cb557b196386486cd417f7161883580083a4e1cf35373cf86a6ebf01b |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 




Ticket_id :: 13580| Hash :: b4fa3c33cbde230fe8d380077c466d8381c5e51abacc238cea0fdeab85d5a23e |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13581| Hash :: 8746920b74540fed19405b7eb74d3a59d202bae7c7c63d8a6625f9aeb7d54151 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13582| Hash :: 4a42ce21cf1d8920302a5e351a3e8731e0c1855afdbf0b495406668f5b40b18c |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13583| Hash :: 2c65aaa41048cfe4a73f37ae41b23132ac4f1bceab04452edeedcc2c7478c625 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13585| Hash :: e9b88a2d4fc78bf5fc76d73c9a758cef7eb4d2770062200272fc6b7da4e66c12 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13587| Hash :: 0b29d129e20a08730ae90f59e1588d12807e0fa2e0dcebc6a04cecaa1078c7e9 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13588| Hash :: b34e9a57d66de83d65f6d323dc27e4875c27e64054c26eb31bb7d56d6170d8af |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13589| Hash :: 4c3b9dc3294cd6e991daa512aaf0cc7363834c7d3f4e2ba24bce762658c2d7df |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13590| Hash :: 8b731027c557affe5b7701cd270e4a8e202e26dba901ea3cfe82db47b401c448 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13592| Hash :: dec371f63f7a5ca1eb78ec8b7b6921ca2699038d014868fe0c1a64e5893ea1c5 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13595| Hash :: 4e09da65078cb69ed5560298f5d81f3436ad30cf215d95f6cb151f22553c5528 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13596| Hash :: dd326397a6b156428c35f851a92bd427b95cef0c374f58f69472de3997577c4c |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13597| Hash :: 406dda3cfe89e5298e2e9043a05abe3d94f3d7baf471d9f72b98a75a38576335 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13598| Hash :: 2411ef63cb0dab056cc728222e0d4212ed35af6557231314ca572f84b13ce51d |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13599| Hash :: 4334dd973180b7edaf775e741a333194a5c4564857484928db75c37e9fab7beb |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13600| Hash :: 8e2512593c80856ef19758ed13948723810279cf9ad06ca4a97b9de98c3484fd |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13602| Hash :: 77cade69c0bfbd7802cd184efb19375194296bf215c58d0cfb1b585185642830 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13603| Hash :: 86c87e3dc3afaa9e913c8b2864dd416775236d465f574cb865b480acd79731fb |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13605| Hash :: ebb875da699c8bb7d6faf9e6177204ac9cc4f8638185e8933fc12d6dc51bb687 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13607| Hash :: 70d0a20a6044d01f9c30944f7badc01c0562ed03b12211bbab0e629ea12a4183 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13608| Hash :: 79dcb7856fa20f22dafe299989e37cebba50173e598cbc7128f0a7cde6306ab9 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13610| Hash :: cbd08f9ee663d3dc4c014f42d2883be11c8afd4831e4935a245a29f81fc2c1d8 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13611| Hash :: 9fc2a2b91114bdfb7867edb8e713bde9799559b6566650a50e04b786daaf4196 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13613| Hash :: 05aae0a0e11b473b6be4d81dd302ad7f26dcdb0b6ad90c259ee3a4590b73ee37 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13614| Hash :: 518ddc0e74379ac65c1397c0dcb21dd83553a3e81d40a7db12ecc2224694b95c |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13618| Hash :: 00ebf7aa2cd37161e438276784f2f73068b7cbdd8efb17329aa1da5864e29f51 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13619| Hash :: 42a02047511a16dbb2ea31e1d9a5b55b7071a75b26229ce26a74ba739b859d1e |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13622| Hash :: 6c491b74579119baf2f8390237ed9056106fa239ddde1010cd92b271243a404a |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13623| Hash :: 2d67408a79e7cd4af46b2ed92001159bb500a33a14e26c0602b15ab45540c575 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13625| Hash :: fdb7bc15519878e7d5dbf1f10253ee9f179ed5c0de50535cd6e60e04e8229c4a |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13626| Hash :: c6ffc7f6f8b18df387a570971c4d8f8b75e31866af1d2199491a2da37567c8b0 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13628| Hash :: 68bb34f4e504b700c11f7d73452a1806a1d473c3eff6535d45de341b1c88044b |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13629| Hash :: 6ab65982a1280c6c45d62b0ffb2dd2573d3d862e5ea36891308778a54c2d8beb |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13631| Hash :: 1880917c5751afe73831bb6626fbdb5152dd8fa38cdbd8deff76164254c3314b |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13634| Hash :: 2c40c6002e4869176f6031f296d2ebef1d8b0bce2ff95881cd446f9e03539464 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13635| Hash :: 682b6c7c4a0c8b69675add6effe0bbecfd229f5497f4fe587473aa047eabc685 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13636| Hash :: fc7d02a8068e2efdc7e2eab2d9418f6ebcf65665825bd0fe4e76309234815f25 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13637| Hash :: e34208573c6eb2f101074dc451a378a3fce9ab89f4fd23ee7a8bccd20638516b |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13638| Hash :: 3da6330ec36cf400d34d5a81721e60a9b828d26879ea2c32fa9f9b35d8a2a546 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13639| Hash :: f322beaa5784e07b8e7d06f824cbea87ff2218437bdfd700d71b1c27019024c9 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13641| Hash :: 7588a0128b2bfc60b6062d2747fb3ab7f4143c71e9754b0a8730883ca76bbe99 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13644| Hash :: 1438aece19822328f1083ceaef5cd322047c36a404046bcc9459d5cc0e84e4b2 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13645| Hash :: 3263b547be6c1af4af12fc0e22613916b453ae96658d3e357aac3b433ea0e3a5 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13646| Hash :: 0e90720a7addb9302e77e5297a4b406ea784885a329a5737c690f81b8cdc20f1 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13647| Hash :: 80d96fcb92bb587f3433d3823300daf2ad875eb9b53304d84f8c5ca838c30e26 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13649| Hash :: 920b31e4b40e3091634dd54528e83f7fbbb78d311a6aa01d179bf3d74695cab4 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13650| Hash :: 9504fe262b629a94a46245c91fba91c95fe8b44bb88585f6146624594e3b386b |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13651| Hash :: 6311d76e917208347c3b33001a9607f10cc47699445b598caf0d6cb11b2f3ce0 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13652| Hash :: 3334f6569e05df22b538741a208b5ab0954d6977878d22478eec4120a664e939 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13654| Hash :: 52b3f97eb98dd65f2a6f53a581df9a1454799ab3e9965a6b630bab48dc77831a |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13655| Hash :: 46f089369bd407181888246e1c105c71126b92b3f8a14bb5f34a5b84408266b6 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13656| Hash :: 540c5064a46d34e3944cff164f0f6945c47f199405ffa644a55f3cdc7c079bc6 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13659| Hash :: 40fd67d4a466d894f9ebe8649a20a3a22ae34c5687316ddd66f6c6340693f66d |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13661| Hash :: 02957b2002a815e2ff33ad19c983c7387c6ebbd96b95abd2af7f3ff00a1e160a |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13662| Hash :: 890e6052be480b61981e9fa602215f12bfcfd41e99eccc9486799dc71241cf10 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13663| Hash :: fd26ca1af59096bc373611c555d3aa1c8cae12f348e23a69e36ce205f29e4f6d |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13666| Hash :: 0ec8c89d49a4c418621ee88ed8722b6921fb5647877049910048c6046a1fb9a6 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13667| Hash :: ec8247d1721cb04d28f2efed8ea4581efcf3a7678b701ea2740b4b3003d68d39 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13670| Hash :: db71ea56b97c6f2e5e2d7e8b018053e35e1119e710b2f67edd562029fa62ad45 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13672| Hash :: 32bcf486c989f140d6496c24bad3de59bbe438e20516feac74644bd8562e97aa |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13674| Hash :: 873dbd3ef902bb7478b692f9d415a7565bc4d37c79750b95b907b5d47c99d9a6 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13676| Hash :: a9822d7d7a45d82fbb2e6afa488f9ca869cfa4e19a8876f488f3fbdb0925fbc0 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13681| Hash :: 06e17d07c49d3b93fe84bc641d7607fd61ec36a7eb5ea9aece275e31cd85eabc |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13682| Hash :: fde38705863198c5d44be0fe48ca59f3a600740adcf13347d997d66f0f05cfc8 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13683| Hash :: d47353df4baead38102761026ae00f0fc93b2eac477ce002737ce7a8371f8c8d |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13684| Hash :: f7caec54d03933e91e6a6af2f68713c2361f2988db8cbfaec688c724820fe93c |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13685| Hash :: 025d85e3d971cd9e97e253451e9790fdbbe3a6bf08bee2eafe3c848284b281c8 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13686| Hash :: 2003cdca3cabb9a07822a77ee5a6aba62c64a9551c6e1c2e6e5babded887d1ee |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13691| Hash :: fe515a2928e832f1a74e97de90a43d362d1c145604b09acd9de349d5c9ca8b71 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13692| Hash :: 1fb8482d3dcba74d91a8acdf3395d4416067951a876f70fcc6599c9aacdeb4c4 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13694| Hash :: 112971a398f6c679024eec033abca88dafda335e1d24867c52d19f725debdd92 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13695| Hash :: cc7a08f71e62fe2a59fd39bcc10f78c2bd39fdc35fb53a6acaf94b217a7e052c |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13696| Hash :: 895cc11640f486aed34e76c5d4193d32acc0621fe6154e422604869c5ee5d650 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13698| Hash :: d923d5583af9ee695df72dbf48cbf1bc62773a4b9757b7cc06510b3f110288f8 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13701| Hash :: 871607b349b03163899602893605c1a124cab4d0509a7316721887a31a43ea1e |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13702| Hash :: 4e72a98ac44c8d3290431eaeef02fd09eccc14f04d7be79bc54160e6ec104dbf |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13704| Hash :: ecba6b2073de9d77b3ac55745aba6d5a6b352534f086a8b2b33b475e72ea6dd5 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13705| Hash :: ea5e14d81d5467ea5cec11096c5e7b56aba5ecec1aee5aec0b15044367f8efd8 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13706| Hash :: 65e89be2ccbe5d5237be37392d6466f16e352f1453952b49cab87329df72485b |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 




Ticket_id :: 13711| Hash :: ae5594b7199c3a1bd9b7168de58735305ff5b094583b967f3efaa3766a80d303 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13712| Hash :: 5954fe89aa596744d5be2c34e47abef56d33265ab06a99c68ef37f9ff859df84 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13713| Hash :: 7e224a90861c7932163874671a4f2ded759a55c7d015c1a337a1a1c819027cef |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13714| Hash :: ab875a6c807b2e087312ee7fe51c6b8c5cfc4697da46365618f90719ba88d84f |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13715| Hash :: e4c035bc3fd34f64527c4b1eb2801705847316660f6fc08dbec7956fb9dc99a9 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13716| Hash :: af6cb9fa41d6a33820198617db0e56d8d70c9fe8075462bfb5a4255563472e34 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13717| Hash :: 95c2ad42c790844aa9d2cc92e4b8639a7ca3d9e0044b4c5cef79de1dc4ae0c4a |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13718| Hash :: efad5919d6d0de536743647cad0e0fb8b94fa4b754a535d4f7723bc326ecffc2 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13719| Hash :: e0bf01ab94960115dd236fc5dd584b43d4aeb0591ab0e757f56b9f8d2ee53269 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13720| Hash :: 0e453eabc673cece4272dbcffa74ff3839a95a0cb9766949c561d666f043c5f6 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13721| Hash :: c9e9880f2e6c2e48c12116e4b02ac5c1ab601a87c4fcaa09dcadde3c24533e8c |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13722| Hash :: 9b9f0ab1e5bede4a707555680a27980b7785a4b8926a75d1f9c807280b7b62f6 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13724| Hash :: 907f1535e194d3eb5d56fd8fcfa95fb19120cacdac1fcb39f6516f117433a691 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13725| Hash :: e37c1e6210ef8345b73e99f0d15a90777aba10f7a343f9610f0476eac538c260 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13727| Hash :: 6339dc6c8c3d04b2f6f6fe6437393905faa2d5cd546c5468bd960bb21276bdee |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13728| Hash :: 51c5fc326b12a391f2b042386ae4b74c5b5f7bc92357b58d1f93ac19b00894ab |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13729| Hash :: 001e6abbecd6ebef4d8a81aadbde51781308ed5a20b4ee010006ae23f5d09245 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13730| Hash :: f3d1b592e652d7981857fa040a5fa7ccfd92425d34149c526ab7f2096d1d47b2 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13734| Hash :: 1ed2d91e3522ee9c20f69ab94783c28e475764aeabf6f84aad8d4d11f5133870 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13737| Hash :: 18cb505e8fc5c04f783d4c59ac0222d147a84665136b2758b0002ea951673555 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13738| Hash :: c62719ea93e618e43f976eaf080e1c0979a8bc183ad5f0ce3167f1169c4e6dd3 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13739| Hash :: c140efe826c0e17a391ec84e38e25a984a8ddbe010920501c8ccc3551abfcc9e |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13740| Hash :: 47fef6214721c63149c57c599833b4d76ff9cf97607af7ab9adc604b4e8825ec |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13741| Hash :: 160a2bc5f20fb141cab880a1c49e73d5fc8d18a0346ced3e00a4d58870e308c7 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13745| Hash :: 5822fd0ef9cc56bf25dd1d6ffbdab0bfe0cba1d3b4ea5bf5450371b6d962eed3 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13746| Hash :: f8a40f7336350835ccf4335a63ba3540a46e631dfde2029c55f154e3a6b47065 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13747| Hash :: e2a72d40b2e3931a3266d560e5553243aea3737e388e2dec548a2a6bfa446d18 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13748| Hash :: 8f4dd32fb2b450d1acc275f276e0156f8abc03ec83e186a02140774d28842287 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13750| Hash :: 71d5f12f895f4143362d521cf044bf3758508062a4405d65d07a0b89f4f563d4 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13751| Hash :: abafe7c95bc7d172caab3feee963738ab1ec1e272e0d3ab587a737b05efbedb6 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13752| Hash :: 3b9321bd4b4ecf92c067999ddfa63fee0a10403755a83e26c617809130c73b00 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13754| Hash :: c629f114a51dca2560556150638004cce240e33d0d648233e22ee5c2c9f79bee |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13755| Hash :: f646ecc288af7114a73e9c99bdf561daccc1a50ca72ffbaa66e642292c62b0d4 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13756| Hash :: b2f7b5f644de41d45f9d726db215dec310059db9e365141ab0697d941f659617 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13757| Hash :: 1af9cb417536a5dfc8e64ab736ebbd5b24054a5b65136faddec13daaf33ae8d7 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13758| Hash :: 66d99cc6d9b604443e995577c3e9596a1f601f71a3ed5b1f4dcf45c5214e0820 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13759| Hash :: 2b5043eecb068c49830cb67473ac9ae48b17989b9625fd2ca9a3685a8c4cbf1c |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13760| Hash :: 7768e79526672091fdbcc7e91230bee2cd01a4627e40bbd67620f4194ef7f3cf |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13761| Hash :: ff8c86030088e513d2f1b8571816b1efe9ce96c1d0e1806a9f2de2b434605cd1 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13762| Hash :: 3eb5e8784cac968ab3e296a54168834044560dfd096f7b3962696d33d3039739 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13763| Hash :: 994b402c59cd6d7afadf2ee5bb0ef6e1d9f7472f3cf3a3cd9f17f85bf6dba731 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13767| Hash :: 8d6831b3b18e68925fe32f4e25c143eecccd4bd2343831f87fed3ce341d43539 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13769| Hash :: 91bb7d549b2943d3a6b20751a47e233bd92860878f3e83c8db3b88a6cfb77cac |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13770| Hash :: 44a1ab822abe221750223d754a85c20ddde8f7c99b72d086746d356a7d6d50c5 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13771| Hash :: 46e39d701ececd4f9b4e65904202f9dbf7038024b70eadb74a4e83c280bd23c2 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13773| Hash :: 303c403edbfc98bc78a3d0dfcabf568acae848be6a2516069b6c6fd254e657e6 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13775| Hash :: 3112078d3afbe2647c2f42847be25422ae0e17d9f1e8569da6e25eb365503140 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13778| Hash :: 4c335ebc907cc308c0e670129b1afcbb1ca959b4e3e844c01c97185eef695eee |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13779| Hash :: cc8d5366612c14e17ff3465b6954c65b988a2eeae0b6dde04605c50c929be2e4 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13780| Hash :: d3deb3f66eabf9fc7b8b4a3234e038cab597c73cbe72ed3b28f0cf47e3a073df |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13783| Hash :: 2a8a1f7c80907375d1e5e3961beecc63c9814192de4aa61a369ced7ff1f7f3e7 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13786| Hash :: afe102944835f7f0cd962d059085cf2b00c4ffd005b6cc20c1c09cbb1693e5f9 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13787| Hash :: b903d843eeeedd851495eadbd9e4e701d14d76fc1eea4c158fe9e9039edc5fe2 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13788| Hash :: 1ffb80ab47a3a6ae87b87edf17856df48c4fa6eebfd7ba759206f06dabd6ceec |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13794| Hash :: 4578713c5d682c8bd8ae3c72e8f689de38e15cd8e577e0c78b2fa95b57ec42b6 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13795| Hash :: ca35567143cafd57384b8269d0bfcf162b5ec2f0a6fe390d00106e8e3cb891dc |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13797| Hash :: 8b9e83266b393f23143f2f5bc07f82ba9247572bc614231f188894abf5f3aa55 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13805| Hash :: a211ebb8298025a934736b515f48572d8f6fa21175722b9ef7b6bcb573869e36 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13811| Hash :: 82fcd3b27b3815908b4f0d49be8e22cb848e73795540eaf278dd853aaac738f1 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13837| Hash :: 61efb752ab2d57b095c88e844f321850236c0372ee18d0530aaa5ba4ace53de7 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13906| Hash :: f89f076e3e820a535579f04b6a094e9ba792d43a2b6b01c798bc0dcbf3feda63 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13947| Hash :: 3faee4491e4285cab3e863214bbdca2be426413f9b9c349037916192d10b2fa0 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13948| Hash :: 8bd8fa1861e3f2480693b15333d5d21429d459f2baf88dc9d0084c3e69782c03 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13949| Hash :: be69138ea74855d4b10f36f3cf72bcffcc90f9f13d2780d5d141751e2b889714 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13951| Hash :: b8f7ef6df38b078dc78cc0bd16de13a88b30cdcedc8d3f58f8aee2a24db5c95c |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13952| Hash :: c60d9fd182e6d183e179631b8b78bd46ff92dc6e6dbf25039288386c6a349029 |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 13953| Hash :: deb7a0ba8faf9ca2e0614a6ff830def805309bfde4d29c6cfda48e5e40bb6c04 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14114| Hash :: db35642810d7f1dff96f11e87faaf88dfe0dcea369ef1ec67aaa52640ba193d8 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14115| Hash :: 258335e8a962fb3d2fe49b5ec9eb4a61f0a08f0c998dc133e8d3344743da285a |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14117| Hash :: 77de33bdfc5c9b3c3e5271632244023dab5129f69518f103e22b5297aec45fd4 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14118| Hash :: 87cfd7e566062c0f3634e9045530476ee6e6fc07d8550bf5f9d085fa50df392d |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14120| Hash :: f59ffccb3a00f8d160c1d85982658fc28e38fba96a1ef3a8d2509b7f8ea5437a |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14121| Hash :: 7ed4db26e7ba6c31ec78fc00ae7dbe41b662cd2b894c8cd89d1d1ee428d284b6 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14125| Hash :: 0c868f31353265b4c711c6183808ab068e9bc93951de15f99a0280203e09e697 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14126| Hash :: 4f08170d3fa0e243892f306a673f014338e44a14879fb19ec0a1bb7ef9893695 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14129| Hash :: 8cf92bd7039dc67a907340eb72b9db9d2a84e6b61c0ad74e241b8a397c52d1a9 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14130| Hash :: fa9ed376bb204ff3b3a23ff3241b954247748616c968c4225be215cdaf0fa6cb |Prediction :: 1 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14131| Hash :: cbad1ea3905b30bfadfeaeecd5b7c9eb3b4e7d818861e6ff70df4b408ce6bac3 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14133| Hash :: 1aa72bd1ee85693c9087dc29f64b283801c630ed19d9ebe04bbc6defad9bd871 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 




Ticket_id :: 14136| Hash :: 7ab348c24151db31305f9a838b6485d50282cbb32159a98ebb790291219b4a47 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14138| Hash :: 6a44b89bb55dfc573e0bdf518b87a40ab4b53883baeac0dd44d2c2f4a2fd8bfa |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14139| Hash :: b10deb13f38276dc704d4401942b7ee61668ddc232c9a6444ebbfd909d51ba7b |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14145| Hash :: 2c19938d709cefb4fa242ffa6fbf740f86ffc35f21beca35e8877144fb8e88f6 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14146| Hash :: 3bd6e2e629d191821ad20429f2d6c89262971096085ca3a0598f4f158dd8961c |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14147| Hash :: 22bd2dc90bc82a1460bf611899e92daf9249cc94c4c69ca7d8c65a0e9654545e |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14149| Hash :: 2e5fcaf9ae5e75da386fe489b8befb4bef21c90714096dd73a83e7bb2150fe33 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14150| Hash :: 3131bd2696034ed1cbcde20346cc3ea58670a79cb42dfc41df11591dc10637af |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14152| Hash :: afbdeb12c76974827841abb2e2822cf59171245a36e94bffe05705c036d85f1e |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14153| Hash :: 186772fa40d06f72a1258347eea937ce5a9a8996619af480cf136cd18fc2c927 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14155| Hash :: f049671d230a471329f34d3d9893fbbfcc6488038ede2627a5fcb57e93174b86 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14156| Hash :: de569c8133bd43c68616857d63de48f8bc331045234c64e1da16a47bcc478047 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14157| Hash :: aa5d6d960cb33a63742a621f8fe7e27b726731af818fc6aba7ecbda74fbc6d9d |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14158| Hash :: c0e77a9a1b9313f1e97924ed5ca4df4fb8e887dd4280e68a3967d6bf2c37b289 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14159| Hash :: d975733e5851d86cffc66e1a40e70a3af65bbf5cc4ad2509ded20f8ede4c080f |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14160| Hash :: ba4a6c6a91677a33bc74dc1a14e06914582fd4d70a5616ba965d1c498f1b4084 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14161| Hash :: fdea155356cd4fd6c961013b3c5adbe62ff8cca92361ff19266b56d193ec9be9 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14162| Hash :: aee631d034e427c4110a0fd6c2c48d617855b2daa9be4e6f3096b3cf63976f91 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14164| Hash :: 4d0ffb14cc9b69ef9a8b0e48b71c6b09503c82855d5f6f2f870417ff9ebbf6da |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14166| Hash :: b0c3d2fedf6a9277d3820638d0f8489e7b8b2e26aeedfdd430a2cb80556ee4b4 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14168| Hash :: 51baa9a72677f0323da36d95833f7268da5507984cac5d477ed925f41089770a |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14169| Hash :: 6535ccbe7dab021bb54c966644082664535aa425c77cd7ac26f79b29e3688c5a |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14170| Hash :: c103b8b94ccbeac36fa53896ab028ffe3d806417469bfed818ebb1aee07a2d0d |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14171| Hash :: 8d364ebf3d959c0041e7540288c4aa1c3ecaf3418922715c2e4e6d4965a737a4 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14172| Hash :: c184152e9936920724bacaf484909e454f5a2d61511138e65f7428648ff5e7d5 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14173| Hash :: 0e60420d6b98e526aedb141199e3b9447bf964ff5c0dfe2e8af07797ab79f780 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14174| Hash :: 06fac8d03f59f563e4e435577e02e6267a1c40d7fe3752169ed60d1b622ba41e |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14176| Hash :: f8c9db72dbddc1498fb2c04ff7664f629dc6570c334d0bae36976fb7b2ffe4a6 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14178| Hash :: be107cb52429384f9aab938778a506838ebd840210a3722fe6a6c997bea74936 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14179| Hash :: 7b3285c0af76e661a49d5772a636d69307731c6b5b3ded3fd653ad3b63beb145 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14180| Hash :: 70baf80d1b2da5e1526d849c16e93e76c8893e348c5baf00634688188ccf54f5 |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 
Ticket_id :: 14182| Hash :: c9e7cadc92f256f93a9400e293fff023084190d660aa0b12644bd3cc8a81cf1e |Prediction :: 0 |  Actual val :: 0 










10 Appendix B 
Saved iptable Rules 
 
  
# Generated by iptables-save v1.4.21 on Mon Apr 25 20:23:54 2016 
*nat 
:PREROUTING ACCEPT [539:83843] 
:INPUT ACCEPT [539:83843] 
:OUTPUT ACCEPT [7032:446659] 
:POSTROUTING ACCEPT [4:292] 
-A POSTROUTING -s 192.168.122.0/24 -d 224.0.0.0/24 -j RETURN 
-A POSTROUTING -s 192.168.122.0/24 -d 255.255.255.255/32 -j RETURN 
-A POSTROUTING -s 192.168.122.0/24 ! -d 192.168.122.0/24 -p tcp -j MASQUERADE --to-ports 
1024-65535 
-A POSTROUTING -s 192.168.122.0/24 ! -d 192.168.122.0/24 -p udp -j MASQUERADE --to-ports 
1024-65535 
-A POSTROUTING -s 192.168.122.0/24 ! -d 192.168.122.0/24 -j MASQUERADE 
-A POSTROUTING -j MASQUERADE 
COMMIT 
# Completed on Mon Apr 25 20:23:54 2016 
# Generated by iptables-save v1.4.21 on Mon Apr 25 20:23:54 2016 
*mangle 
:PREROUTING ACCEPT [264049:47887124] 
:INPUT ACCEPT [264049:47887124] 
:FORWARD ACCEPT [0:0] 
:OUTPUT ACCEPT [65378:591851790] 
:POSTROUTING ACCEPT [65485:591859013] 
-A POSTROUTING -o virbr0 -p udp -m udp --dport 68 -j CHECKSUM --checksum-fill 
COMMIT 
# Completed on Mon Apr 25 20:23:54 2016 
# Generated by iptables-save v1.4.21 on Mon Apr 25 20:23:54 2016 
*filter 
:INPUT ACCEPT [119:26451] 
:FORWARD ACCEPT [0:0] 
:OUTPUT ACCEPT [113:24770] 
-A INPUT -i virbr0 -p udp -m udp --dport 53 -j ACCEPT 
-A INPUT -i virbr0 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 53 -j ACCEPT 
-A INPUT -i virbr0 -p udp -m udp --dport 67 -j ACCEPT 
-A INPUT -i virbr0 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 67 -j ACCEPT 
-A INPUT -s 192.168.0.0/24 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 27017 -m state --state NEW,ESTABLISHED -j 
ACCEPT 
-A FORWARD -d 192.168.122.0/24 -o virbr0 -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j 
ACCEPT 
-A FORWARD -s 192.168.122.0/24 -i virbr0 -j ACCEPT 
-A FORWARD -s 192.168.56.0/24 -i vboxnet0 -o em1 -m conntrack --ctstate NEW -j ACCEPT 
-A FORWARD -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT 
-A FORWARD -i virbr0 -o virbr0 -j ACCEPT 
-A FORWARD -o virbr0 -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-port-unreachable 
-A FORWARD -i virbr0 -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-port-unreachable 
-A OUTPUT -o virbr0 -p udp -m udp --dport 68 -j ACCEPT 
-A OUTPUT -d 192.168.0.0/24 -p tcp -m tcp --sport 27017 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j 
ACCEPT 
COMMIT 





11 AndroSandX Product Source Code 
Complete source code of the AndroSandX and other results data sets are available in the 
attached CD. 
